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THE EEOC SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDELINES:
WELCOME ADVANCES UNDER TITLE VII?
Lynn McLaint
The interpretative guidelines on sexual harassmen
recently promulgated by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, describe those acts taken toward an
employee that the Commission considers employment dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Additionally, the guidelines define under
what circumstances an employer will be held liable for
sexual harassment of his or her employees. In this article,
the author examines the new guidelines in light of their
statutory bases in Title VII and case law interpreting the
statute. She explains the guidelines'provisions and criti-
cally evaluates those sections she finds without statutory
and case support.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "sexual harassment" is generally understood to em-
brace such lecherous behavior as repeatedly making unwanted
sexual propositions to an individual or touching another in a sex-
ual way, without his or her consent.1 Some understand the term to
include the making of lewd comments. 2 The most egregious form
of sexual harassment in the employment context is the extortion
of sexual favors by a boss who threatens to fire an employee who
refuses to submit.3 Such forms of harassment appear to be wide-
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1971; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1974;
Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Member, Maryland Bar.
1. E.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1-2 (1979) [herein-
after cited as MACKINNON]; James, Court Extends Bar to Job Shift in Harassment
Case, The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Feb. 18, 1981, at D12, col. 1.
2. For a discussion of various definitions of sexual harassment, see U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROB-
LEM? G-3-G-4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE]. The Office of Personnel Management defines sexual harassment as
"deliberate or repeated unsolicited verbal comments, gestures or physical contact of
a sexual nature which are unwelcome." Id at 20.
3. See, e.g., Note, Job-Related Sexual Harassment & Union Women: What Are Their
Rights?, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 929, 936-37 (1980).
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spread.4 In 1978, for example, over 70% of the women surveyed by
the Working Women United Institute felt that they had been sex-
ually harassed in their employment.' Of these, 56% said they had
experienced physical harassment and 91% reported that they had
been verbally harassed.6 In a more extensive survey of federal
government employees, 42% of the women and 15% of the men 7
complained that they had been sexually harassed in the workplace
during a two-year period from May 1978 to May 1980.8
4. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980) (supplementary information accompanying
EEOC's interim guidelines on sexual harassment); Hosler, Sexual Harassment Still
the Norm at Fort Meade, The Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 4, 1980, at Al, col. 1; Hosler,
Women Say Sexual Harassment is Driving Them Out of the Army, The Sun
(Baltimore), Dec. 16, 1979, at Al, col. 1; Priest, SexualHarassment San Jose Mercury
News, Sept. 28, 1980, at IL, col. 1; Comment, Title VII: Legal Protection Against
Sexual Harassment; 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 124 n.5 (1977); Note, Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 879, 879 & n.2 (1980); Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Vic-
tim of Work-Related Sexual Harassment, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 173-74 & n.5
(1980).
5. Banisky, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Who Says Boys Will be Boys?, The Sun
(Baltimore), Dec. 12, 1978, at B5, col. 1. One commentator interprets the results of
this survey differently. She concludes that the survey showed that "from five to
seven of every ten women" of a sample of 145 reported experiencing sexual harass-
ment. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 26, 249 n.5.
6. Banisky, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Who Says Boys Will be Boys?, The Sun
(Baltimore), Dec. 12, 1978, at B5, col. 1. But one author's estimates of the survey re-
sults are one-third and two-thirds, respectively. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 29.
7. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 3, 33, 36. These
percentages are based on over 20,000 responses to a survey requested by the Sub-
committee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Ser-
vice. Id. at v. The percentages for various types of sexual harassment are as follows:
Women Men
Sexual remarks 33% 10%
Suggestive looks 28% 8%
Deliberate touching 26% 7%
Pressure for dates 15% 3%
Pressure for sexual favors 9% 2%
Letters and calls 9% 3%
Actual or attempted rape or assault 1% 0.3%
Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 2.
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Despite the fact that sexual harassment of employees is a
long-standing problem,9 the courts have only recently begun to
struggle with the question of when, if ever, sexual harassment in
the workplace constitutes sex discrimination in employment pro-
hibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).1o
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment because of an in-
dividual's sex." Although the statute does not define the term
"sex," it has been consistently interpreted by the courts as being
synonymous with gender.1 2 The circuit courts of appeal which
have addressed the issue are unanimous that, when certain other
criteria are satisfied, harassment of employees of one gender but
not of the other gender violates Title VII. 3 There are conflicting
interpretations of Title VII, however, with regard to the extent
that the employer must have participated in, had knowledge of, or
ratified the harassment, before the employer will be held respon-
sible. 4 The United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to
grant certiorari in a Title VII sexual harassment case.
1 5
Recently, the federal agency charged with the administration
of Title VII,16 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
9. For example, a 1907 letter to the editor of New York's Jewish Daily Forward reads:
I am one of those unfortunate girls thrown by fate into a dark and dis-
mal shop. In this shop there is a foreman who has a wife and several children.
In spite of this, he often allows himself to "have fun" with some of the work-
ing girls.... Though my hard earned dollars mean a lot to my family of eight
souls, I didn't want to accept the foreman's vulgar advances. He started to
pick on me, said my work was no good, and when I proved to him he was
wrong, he started to shout at me in the vilest language. He insulted me in
Yiddish and then in English, so the American workers could understand....
I ran home and am now without a job and the girls in the shop are afraid to
be witnesses against him. What can be done about this?
Leavitt, What Shall IDo?, The Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 22, 1981, at A19, col. 4. See also
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 175-79.
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. Id. § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
12. See notes 37-59 and accompanying text infra.
13. E.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam). The first few federal district courts to consider the question held that sexual
harassment was not the type of activity that was meant to be proscribed by Title
VII. Each decision was reversed or vacated on appeal. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd & remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated & remanded mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. See notes 227-41 and accompanying text infra.
15. No one has petitioned the Court for certiorari in such a case.
16. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. III 1979).
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(EEOC), promulgated guidelines on sexual harassment. 17 These
guidelines serve to inform the public and the courts of the
agency's position as. to what type of conduct constitutes sexual
harassment violative of Title VII. 8 Through the new guidelines
the EEOC has mounted an all-out attack against sexual harass-
ment. Because such harassment is offensive and reprehensible,
the agency's zeal is understandable. The EEOC's authority, as
granted by Congress in Title VII, however, appears to be ex-
ceeded by the power the agency purports to wield through the
guidelines. In its attempt to limit sexual harassment in the work-
place, the EEOC seems to have lost sight of three important stat-
utory bases that should be but are not adequately reflected in the
guidelines. In order to be actionable as sex discrimination under
Title VII, employment-related acts must discriminate between
males and females, 9 have significant adverse employment ramifi-
cations,20 and be acts of an employer or its agents.
This article describes and interprets some of the guidelines'
provisions in relation to Title VII and the case law interpreting it.
Three primary topics in this discussion are (1) the guidelines'
failure to require a comparison of the employer's treatment of
male and female employees;2 2 (2) the question of whether the
harassment must have substantial adverse employment ramifica-
tions in order to be actionable;23 and (3) the employer's liability
under the guidelines for the acts of non-agents as well as its
agents.2 4 Before examining the language of the guidelines and re-
cent EEOC and court decisions interpreting it, this article will ex-
plain the Title VII statutory provisions that are particularly rele-
vant to sexual harassment cases and will describe the EEOC's role
in the enforcement of Title VII. The article concludes with a brief
17. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
18. Id at 25,024 (summary accompanying interim guidelines). A subcommittee of the
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service requested the EEOC to publish
the guidelines. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at
19. The Commission first promulgated interim guidelines, now reported at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (1980), which became effective April 11, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
After soliciting comments on the guidelines from the public, the EEOC reported that
"[diuring the 60-day public comment period which ended on June 10, 1980, the Com-
mission received over 160 letters regarding the Guidelines on sexual harassment.
These comments came from all sectors of the public, including employers, private in-
dividuals, women's groups, and local, state, and federal government agencies." Id at
74,676. After considering the comments, the EEOC issued slightly revised, final
guidelines on November 10, 1980, which became effective immediately. Id.
19. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text infra
20. See notes 138-39, 176-79 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 207-09 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 91-137 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 138-206 and accompanying text infr.
24. See notes 207-77 and accompanying text infra.
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discussion of common law and statutory remedies available to
sexually harassed employees in lieu of or in conjunction with a
Title VII action.
II. BACKGROUND: TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII applies to most government employers 25 and to pri-
vate employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce and
having fifteen or more employees.26 The major operative language
of Title VII is found in subsections 703(a)(1) 27 and (2).28 In order to
sue successfully under either subsection, a plaintiff must prove
three things: (1) the plaintiff was discriminated against "because
of" his or her "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"; 29 (2)
the discrimination had significant adverse employment ramifica-
tions for the plaintiff;3° and (3) the discrimination was practiced by
an employer covered by Title VII.3 1 A brief account of the mean-
ing of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of ....
sex" will provide a backdrop against which the sexual harassment
guidelines may be examined.
In order for there to be a violation of Title VII, there must
first be inequality of treatment. To discriminate means "to make
distinctions in treatment; show partiality (in favor of) or preju-
dice (against). '3 2 Thus, if an employer treats all employees and ap-
plicants the same, no matter how shoddily, he or she has not dis-
criminated. For example, if an employer pays all of his or her em-
ployees only five cents an hour and beats all of them, there would
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 717(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000Oe16(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Notably excepted are members of Congress, whose staffs are not in the "competitive
service." Id
26. Id § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). The employees must be employed "for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." Id.
27. Id § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Subsection (1) forbids an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id
28. Id § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Subsection (2) forbids an employer "to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id
29. Id § 703(a)(I)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
30. Id
31. Id. In this article, the term "employer" is also used to include employment agencies
and labor organizations whose acts are governed by Title VII. Id § 703(b)-(d), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)-(d).
32. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 522 (2d ed. unabridged 1970)
(italics omitted). "Discrimination" is also defined as "failure to treat all equally;
favoritism." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 553 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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be no discrimination and thus no violation of Title VII. 3 So long
as he treats all of his employees equally badly, Simon Legree may
carry on without fear of Title VII.
Even if the employer does discriminate among its employees,
the discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII unless it is based
on race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.34 Essentially, there
are two accepted theories upon which a plaintiff may rely in mak-
ing a prima facie showing that an employer's alleged discrimina-
tory conduct was because of one of the prohibited factors: the dis-
parate treatment theory and the disparate impact theory.35 Of
these, only the disparate treatment theory has been used in sexual
harassment cases.
36
33. This employer, however, would probably be violating the minimum wage provision of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. III 1979). The employer
would also be liable for civil and criminal assault and battery. See notes 286, 293-95
and accompanying text infr. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 106-30 (2d
ed. 1969) (criminal assault and battery).
34. See, e.g., Wright v. Allis-Chalmers, 496 F. Supp. 349, 351 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (firing
black plaintiff because he assaulted supervisor, even if in response to a racial epithet,
was not termination because of race); Caraway v. Ethyl Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
31,075 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (delay in issuing plaintiff's disability checks not violative of
Title VII because it was for reason other than race). See also MACKINNON, supra note
1, at 106-07.
35. For a brief discussion of some newer theories, see note 133 infra.
36. Therefore, the text of this article will not discuss the disparate impact theory. The
landmark disparate impact case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
in which the Supreme Court held that the requirement that job applicants pass two
standardized tests and have a high school diploma, not shown to be related to job per-
formance, illegally discriminated against blacks, a large percentage of whom had no
diploma and a disproportionate number of whom failed the tests. In applying Griggs
to the sex discrimination arena, it becomes apparent that under the disparate impact
theory, even though similarly situated men and women are treated alike, a prima
facie violation of Title VII arises when the group of all women in the work force is
given less of a chance for a job than the group of all men in the work force. Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977). Contra, id. at 348 (White, J., dissenting) (the
Court should look not at the general population of women but only at those who are
seriously interested in applying for the job in question). For example, if a female ap-
plicant for a job is rejected because she is not 5'6" tall and weighs less than 145
pounds, she need only prove that the minimum height and weight requirements have
a disproportionately adverse impact on women. She must show that a statistically
significant greater percentage of men meet the requirements than do women. Id at
329. The burden then shifts to the employer to show that these criteria that have a
disparate impact on women are job-related; that is, one must meet them in order to
perform the job in question adequately. Id; see, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles,
595 F.2d 1367, 1374-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980) (evidence in-
sufficient to show minimum height requirements valid despite adverse impact on
women); Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 703 n.66, 710 n.76
(D. Md. 1979) (Baltimore City Police Commissioner's minimum height and weight re-
quirements, imposed to keep women, who are "little balls of fluff," from being police
officers, not shown to bear a "manifest relationship" to the job). If the employer can
show that the selection criteria are job-related, then the burden shifts to the
employee to show that there is an alternative available that will result in the hiring of
equally qualified individuals but will have a less adverse impact on women.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1976). Of course, the same analysis
would apply if the discrimination were directed toward males, who are members of a
traditionally preferred class. Cf McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976) (Title VII protects whites from racial discrimination).
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Disparate treatment based on sex exists whenever an em-
ployer treats similarly situated men and women differently simply
because of their gender. 7 For example, if a male police chief who
wishes to hire police officer trainees refuses to consider any female
applicants simply because they are female, he clearly would be
treating males and females differently and would be guilty of dis-
parate treatment.3 A showing that all females are excluded from
consideration for a job is not the only means of proving disparate
treatment. Even if the police chief changed his policy so that
women would be eligible for a position as long as they had no pre-
school children, he would still be guilty of disparate treatment if
male applicants were considered for the job regardless of whether
they had young children.39 Again, he would be treating similarly
situated men and women differently simply because of their
gender. In order to avoid being guilty of disparate treatment, the
police chief would have to deny consideration to both mothers and
fathers of pre-schoolers or allow females with young children the
same opportunity as their similarly situated male counterparts.
As is illustrated by the above examples of disparate treat-
ment, the word "sex" in Title VII has been interpreted to mean
"gender" rather than its other, more titillating, connotations. 40
This interpretation, equating "sex" with "gender," is the only one
that makes sense in the context of subsections 703(a)(1) and (2),
which prohibit discrimination against "an individual .... because
of such individual's .... sex."4' The statute does not define the
term "sex."
37. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(disparate treatment occurs when "[tihe employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
38. In this example, a female plaintiff could make out a prima facie case by showing that
all women are excluded from the job. The burden would shift to the employer to show
that the male sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job of
police officer. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976). If
the chief is unable to show that "all or substantially all" women are incapable of per-
forming the duties of a police officer, he will be found in violation of Title VII. See
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)). The Weeks court further posited that an
employer can prove the male sex is a BFOQ by showing that nearly all women are in-
capable of performing the job so that it is impracticable for the employer to sift the
eligible women from the ineligible. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235
n.5 (5th Cir. 1969). Of course, the employer can also rebut a prima facie case by show-
ing that it did not differentiate between the candidates involved because of their
gender, but for another reason, such as their comparative skills and their qualifica-
tions for the job. E.g., Cummings v. School Dist., 638 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1981) (job
awarded to male because of seniority, not because of gender).
39. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
40. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 149-51, 224.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
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Moreover, the addition of the word "sex" to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was accomplished without significant
legislative comment. 42 None of the Title VII bills considered in
committee or introduced on the floor included a prohibition
against sex discrimination; they were concerned only with racial,
ethnic, and religious discrimination.43 When Title VII was debated
on the floor of Congress, it was, ironically, an opponent of the bill
who, in an ill-fated attempt to defeat it, proposed amending sec-
tion 703 to include the word "sex."" The bill passed, as amended,
without documentation of the intended meaning of the term.
45
Neither then nor subsequently has Congress indicated that it was
concerned with the problem of sexual harassment in employment
when enacting Title VII.
On several occasions since 1964, however, in the course of
amending Title VII, Congress has expressed its concern that
women were not enjoying employment opportunities equal to
those given men. When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to
give the EEOC the right to sue and to cover most federal employ-
ees,46 the House report on the amending House bill included the
following comments:
The situation of the working women is no less serious
[than that of minorities]. Women currently comprise ap-
proximately 38% of the total work force of the Nation.
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a
class. Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated
because of their sex. Numerous studies have shown that
women are placed in the less challenging, the less respon-
sible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of
their sex alone.
4 7
42. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966).
43. Id at 433-37, 442.
44. Id at 439, 441-42.
45. Id. at 441-42.
46. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4(a), 11, 86 Stat.
104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 & -16 (1976)).
47. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2137, 2140-41. The report also included the following remarks:
In recent years, the courts have done much to create a body of law clearly
disapproving of sex discrimination in employment....
This Committee believes that women's rights are not judicial diver-
tissements. Discrimination against women is no less serious [than] ... and is
to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination.
Id. (footnote omitted). None of the four cases that the Committee cited in its footnote
concerned sexual harassment.
[Vol. 10
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Similarly wide-sweeping statements are found in the history of the
1978 amendment to Title VII, which made employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy unlawful. 41 Senator Williams,
chairman of the committee that held hearings on the bill, made the
following comments on the floor of the Senate: "The central pur-
pose of the bill is to require that women workers be treated equally
with other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work. The key to compliance in every case will be equality of treat-
ment. 4 9 The last statement is true not only with regard to preg-
nancy discrimination cases but also with regard to all Title VII
cases.
Because sex discrimination violative of Title VII must be
gender-based, discrimination on the basis of sexual behavior, sex-
uality, or sexual preference will not always constitute disparate
treatment because of sex under Title VII. If Congress had forbid-
den discrimination based on sexual behavior, an employer would
be prohibited from, for example, firing its employees for having
sexual intercourse in the company cafeteria. Because Title VII
does not address sexual behavior, however, the employer is free to
treat its employees as it sees fit as long as it treats both genders
equally. Thus, disciplining only the women for their sexual
behavior because "nice girls don't do that kind of thing" but not
disciplining the men because "boys will be boys" would violate
Title VII.5
°
Acts of an employer dealing with an employee's sexuality like-
wise are not per se within the scope of Title VII. In a suit alleging
sex discrimination under the analogous New York Human Rights
Law," a woman complained that she had been fired from her job
as a cocktail waitress at the Little Foxes Restaurant because the
management felt that her bosom did not adequately fill the bodice
48. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979)).
49. 123 CONG. REC. 29385 (1977) (emphasis added). In the Senate debate of the amending
Senate bill, Senator Javits remarked:
[W]e can no longer in this country legislate with regard to women workers on
the basis of out-dated stereotypes and myths. The facts are that women, like
men, often need employment and support families, [and] that women, like
men, find their work and their careers important sources of self-esteem and
personal growth.
Id. at 29387.
50. Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 195 (EEOC found Title VII violation under similar
facts).
51. New York Human Rights Law § 296(1)(a), N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1972-1980).
19811 283
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of her costume.52 The employer, who required each waitress to use
"padding in order to force the bosom to form a cleavage,15 3 was
treating her as a sex object. Interpreting the New York law's pro-
hibition of discrimination because of "sex" to mean because of
"gender," the court held that the complainant was fired for failing
to wear a properly fitting costume. The court further held that,
because a male would not have been hired for the job, and there-
fore males were not better treated, the complainant had no cause
of action for discrimination because of sex:
5 4
Whatever may be the moral aspects or the errors of such
social concepts [as dressing women to entice male cus-
tomers], the Human Rights Law does not cover this...
"sexism". It provides only for equality of opportunity
without regard to sex. Obviously the complainant was not
rejected because she was female .... 5
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination likewise does not ex-
tend to discrimination between women on the basis of their bust-
lines or any other facet of their sexuality.
Similarly, if an employer fires a male homosexual employee
because of his sexual preference, the employer has not discrim-
inated against him on the basis of sex under Title VII merely
because his firing involved something sexual. Both the EEOC and
the courts consistently have held that, absent proof that the firing
was because of gender, that is, that a similarly situated female
employee (a lesbian) was not or would not have been fired, there
52. State Div. of Human Rights ex reL Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., No.
CS-21209-70 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Board Oct. 20, 1971), affd, 38 A.D.2d
89, 330 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1972) (per curiam), reprinted in M. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG &
H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 634 (1974). Compare St. Cross v. Playboy Club,
No. CSF 22618-70 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Board 1971) (female sex is a
BFOQ for Playboy "bunnies") with Guardian Capital Corp. v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (hiring only sexually attractive waitresses
violates state fair employment practices law in absence of a showing of direct in-
crease in sales volume), appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 806, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1975).
See generally 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 15.10-.20 (rev. ed. 1980).
53. State Div. of Human Rights ex reL Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., No.
CS-21209-70 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Board Oct. 20, 1971), affd, 38 A.D.2d
89, 330 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1972) (per curiam), reprinted in M. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG &
H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 634, 635 (1974).
54. Id.
55. Id.; cf Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (26 Empl.
Prac. Dec.) J 31,921 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's finding that employer's
maximum weight rules for flight attendants did not have discriminatory impact on
women when only womnen were hired as attendants, but remanding for consideration
of claim of disparate treatment as to predominantly male positions such as directors
of passenger service, sales agents, and pilots). But see id. at 21,132 (Schroeder, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would hold that whenever an employer
applies a rule only to employees in a sex-segregated job classification and not to other
employees, a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown.").
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has been no Title VII violation.56 The EEOC7 and the courts"8
have used the same analysis with regard to discrimination against
transsexuals.
The wisdom, cruelty, fairness, or rationality of the employer's
action based on an employee's sexual preference is irrelevant: the
disparate treatment theory is able to redress only inequality of
treatment of the two genders. 9 Disparate treatment of employees
because of their sexual preference, sexuality, sexual behavior, or
other sexually-based but not gender-based criteria is not pro-
hibited by Title VII.
III. ROLE OF THE EEOC IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF TITLE VII
Congress has assigned the EEOC a significant role in the en-
forcement of Title VII. The EEOC may undertake, of its own voli-
tion, investigations of employers whom it has reason to believe
may be violating the Act.60 Also, the Commission must receive in-
dividuals' charges that particular employers are violating Title
V11 61 and act affirmatively on charges that are not frivolous on
their face. 62 Under the streamlined procedures introduced by Ex-
chairperson Eleanor Holmes Norton to reduce the EEOC's huge
backlog of cases, 63 conciliation is usually attempted at an initial
56. E.g., Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & TeL Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); EEOC Decision
No. 77-28, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6578 (1977); EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6495, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1823 (1976); EEOC Deci-
sion No. 76-67, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6493 (1976); cf. Singer v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976) (EEOC's firing of homosexual did
not violate his first or fifth amendment rights), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1034
(1977). To this writer's knowledge, no sexual preference discrimination case has in-
volved the disparate impact theory, although it would be available, for example, if a
male homosexual could show that a significantly higher percentage of males than
females are homosexual.
57. See Terry v. EEOC, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,638 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (transsexual had
no private cause of action against the EEOC for dismissing his sex bias charge).
58. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981); Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977) (discrimination because plaintiff was transsexual was not
because of sex under Title VII). See generally 4 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION §§ 110.10, 111.00 (rev. ed. 1980).
59. See Schaulis v. CTB/McGraw-Hill, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 666,670 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (no dis-
criminatinn where "the alleged malfeasances of defendant afflicted both men and
women equally" since "[i]t is not unlawful [under Title VIII to treat employees un-
fairly, if all employees are similarly treated").
60. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11
(1980).
61. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a)
(1980).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1980). But cf id. § 1601.12(b) (a "charge may be amended ....
to clarify and amplify allegations made therein").
63. See 42 Fed. Reg. 55,388 (1977). See generally A. SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 1115 (1978).
fact-finding conference. 4 If no agreement is reached between the
charging party and the employer, the EEOC may conduct a fur-
ther, full-scale investigation 61 and must conclude whether, in the
agency's opinion, there exists reasonable cause to believe Title
VII has been violated.
66
The EEOC relies on its guidelines both to determine whether
the charges of discrimination are facially frivolous and to form an
opinion regarding reasonable cause. In the first instance, agency
action could be precluded if, under the guidelines, the claim ap-
pears to be without merit. If the claim is not frivolous under the
guidelines, the EEOC will investigate the charge.
Once the EEOC undertakes an investigation, the agency often
seeks to examine not only the charging party's personnel file, but
also the files of other employees. 67 Complying with the discovery
requests of the EEOC, such as for specially compiled statistics, is
costly for the employer.6 First, simply giving up the use of its per-
sonnel who must attend meetings with agency employees and
compile the information required by the EEOC in its investigation
costs the employer many hours that would otherwise be spent in
productive endeavors. Second, the employer must typically hire a
lawyer to negotiate the scope of discovery and to represent it in its
other dealings with the EEOC. Because the meter is running on
the employer's costs during the administrative proceedings, but
during this period the charging party usually hires no attorney69
and incurs no expense, the employer will often settle the com-
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(c) (1980); see EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 101 S. Ct.
817, 821 n.5 (1981). The EEOC states that the fact-finding conference is primarily an
investigative forum, only one of the purposes of which is "to ascertain whether there
is a basis for negotiated settlement of the charge." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(c) (1980). Title
VII provides for the EEOC to make conciliation attempts only after its investigation
and determination that there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15
(1980).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21
(1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 73,036 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b), (d)). The
EEOC may dismiss the charge, however, if the charging party fails to accept a writ-
ten settlement offer that would afford him or her "full relief." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(e)
(1980). Under a guideline effective Oct. 19, 1981, the EEOC may certify state and
local agencies as ones whose findings it will automatically adopt in most cases, with-
out any case-by-case review. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,367 (1981) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1601.75).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1980). See generally 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 48.62 (rev. ed. 1980).
68. See, e.g., Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment & Employer Liability: The Flirtation that
Could Cost a Fortune, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 277, 286 (1980); 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 1 5186 (Jan. 1981) (summary of recommendations concerning role of EEOC to
President Reagan as presented by James A. Parker, transition team leader).
69. But see Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (charging party needs
attorney at administrative level).
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plaint at the EEOC level for a rather high "nuisance value," even
if the charge is unfounded.
If no settlement is reached, the EEOC uses its guidelines to
determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the
employer violated Title VII. If such a finding is made, the Com-
mission may itself sue the employer.70 Because its resources are
limited, the EEOC declines to do so in the vast majority of cases.
More frequently, the charging party will bring a private suit in
federal court against the employer. The charging party may sue
after the EEOC has failed to conciliate within 180 days of its
assuming jurisdiction over the matter, regardless of whether the
EEOC has had time to make a finding concerning whether there
is reasonable cause to believe Title VII has been violated, or
even if the EEOC has made a finding of no such reasonable
cause. 71 The parties are given a trial de novo by the court, 72 so
that, while the EEOC's finding as to reasonable cause may be ad-
mitted into evidence, it is not in any way binding on the court.
7 3
Nonetheless, since the EEOC uses its guidelines both to deter-
mine whether a charge is facially frivolous, so as to preclude
EEOC action, and to evaluate the fruits of its investigations, the
guidelines play a significant part in Title VII enforcement at the
agency level. Moreover, if the parties do not settle the case at the
EEOC level and a court suit is filed, the EEOC guidelines may be
considered by the court as persuasive authority.
Substantive regulations promulgated by the agency charged
with interpreting a statute are routinely given great credence by
the courts.7 4 While Congress has empowered the EEOC to promul-
gate procedural regulations, 75 it has never given the EEOC the
power to promulgate substantive regulations. 76 EEOC guidelines
are so termed because they are not regulations having the force of
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). The charging
party may sue as long as he or she has requested and received a right-to-sue letter
from the agency. Such requests are routinely granted. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1980); 45
Fed. Reg. 73,037 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d)).
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
72. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 801 (D. Md. 1974).
73. E.g., Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding agency finding); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13
(4th Cir. 1972) (admissibility of EEOC finding is left to the trial court's discretion).
Contra, e.g., Smith v. Universal Serv., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1972)
(vacating trial court's judgment and remanding with instructions to reconsider in
light of the EEOC investigative report, which trial court had excluded).
74. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 30.01-.14 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
75. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 713(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976).
76. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); EEOC v. Raymond Metal
Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 592-94 (4th Cir. 1976).
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law.77 Thus, while the EEOC publishes the interpretive guidelines
in order to notify the public of how it feels Title VII should be in-
terpreted and how the agency will interpret the statute in fulfill-
ing its role, and despite the Supreme Court's frequently quoted
statement that EEOC guidelines are entitled to "great defer-
ence,' 78 that Court has not felt compelled to give the guidelines as
much weight as would be given to regulations promulgated under
direct statutory authority. In a 1976 decision, for example, the
Supreme Court rejected EEOC guidelines it found both ill-rea-
soned and inconsistent with a stand the EEOC had earlier taken.7 9
The Court made clear that it will afford "great deference" to
EEOC guidelines only if it is persuaded that the guidelines cor-
rectly interpret Title VII. Despite the Supreme Court's position,
most lower courts apparently remain inclined to defer to EEOC
guidelines because of the perceived expertise of the EEOC on Title
VII questions.8 0
IV. THE EEOC GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Introduction
A plaintiff attempting to prove sex discrimination violative of
Title VII must show that acts which discriminate between per-
sons because of their gender, have significant adverse employ-
ment ramifications 82 and were taken either by an employer
covered by Title VII83 or by its agents.8 4 Because Title VII is the
statutory basis for the EEOC's authority to prohibit sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, the agency's guide-
lines should reflect these three criteria. Without explanation, how-
77. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 211, 301-08 (1979) (certain Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Program regulations held not to amount to "law" authorizing
release of information under Freedom of Information Act).
78. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
79. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 124, 142-43 (1976); accord, Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973) (rejecting EEOC guideline's conclusion that discrimi-
nation because of citizenship is necessarily because of national origin); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,552 (E.D. Va. Jan.
26, 1981) (rejecting, as contrary to law, EEOC guidelines that provide that em-
ployer must offer pregnancy benefits for male employees' spouses if it offers
medical benefits for female employees' spouses), order amended on other grounds, 25
Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,679 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 1981); cf Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447
U.S. 807 (1980) (rejecting EEOC procedural regulation which allowed filing under §
706(e) during, rather than after, the deferral period provided for state and local §
706(e) agencies).
80. E.g., Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (W.D. Va. 1979).
81. See notes 29, 32-59 and accompanying text supra.
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
83. Id § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
84. Id.
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ever, the sexual harassment guidelines fail to require a showing of
discrimination between males and females. Further, the guidelines
set forth broad definitions of the conduct that is actionable and of
the employer's liability for conduct by third persons.8 5 At an ex-
treme, they could be read to make an isolated sexual comment,
aimed at men and women alike and inflicting little or no harm
upon an employee, actionable8 6 even if it were made by a non-agent
of the employer.
7
The EEOC has promised that it will clarify the broad lan-
guage of the guidelines through Commission decisions"" and win
make "no attempt to unfairly prosecute" employers.8 9 Moreover,
the guidelines provide that
[ijn determining whether alleged conduct constitutes
[illegal] sexual harassment, the Commission will look at
the record as a whole and at the totality of the circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The
determination of the legality of a particular action will be
made from the facts, on a case by case basis. 90
The EEOC's initial post-guideline opinions have helped to shed
some light on the intended meaning of the guidelines.
B. Gender-Based Discrimination
The EEOC guidelines define the types of harassing acts which
amount to sex discrimination under Title VII as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of
Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submis-
sion to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) sub-
mission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perfor-
mance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.91
85. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), (e)).
86. See notes 181-82, 195-97 and accompanying text infra.
87. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text infra.
88. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
89. Olson, Sexual Harassment Rules Opposed, The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 13, 1980, at
A12, col. 6.
90. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
91. Id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). This definition, as well as other parts of
the guideline, is adopted by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in
its proposed regulations concerning the programs of federal contractors. 46 Fed. Reg.
42, 986 (1981) (if adopted, to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.25).
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The EEOC seems to equate the phrase in the first sentence refer-
ring to "[h]arassment on the basis of sex" under Title VII with the
term "sexual harassment" in the second sentence.9 2 The supple-
mentary information, published by the agency to accompany the
interim guidelines, which used the same language, supports this
conclusion. In saying there that sexual harassment, "like harass-
ment on the basis of color, race, religion, or national origin, has
long been recognized by EEOC as a violation of Section 703 of
Title VII, ' 9 3 the agency in effect substituted the word "sexual," in
the sense of sexual intercourse or physical sexual attributes of
men and women, for the statutory word "sex. 9 4 The EEOC's ap-
parent equation of "sex" with "sexual" in its lascivious sense is
unsupported by the legislative history of Title VII, which con-
tains no reference to problems arising because of sexual harass-
ment or sexual behavior of any kind in the workplace.96 Congress
expressed concern only with the types of jobs women held and the
lower pay they received; its stated goals were of equal employ-
ment opportunity for similarly qualified males and females. 96
The guideline's apparent equation of "harassment on the
basis of sex" and "sexual harassment" says both too little and too
much. Sex-based harassment under Title VII would include all
harassment, whether sexual or not, of an employee because of his
or her gender.9 7 Thus, the guideline is underinclusive in its ap-
parent overlooking of the possibility of non-sexual but gender-
based harassment. On the other hand, it is overinclusive to the ex-
tent that it covers possible cases of sexual but non-gender-based
harassment.
1. How the Guideline is Underinclusive
The application of the canon of construction "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius" or "the expression of one is the exclusion of
the other" gives rise to the inference that the EEOC finds sexual
92. This problem could have been avoided by stating that harassment on the basis of sex
includes but is not limited to sexual harassment.
93. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980). With regard to the interim guidelines, see note 18 supra.
94. The statute simply provides that employers may not discriminate against individuals
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976). For a discussion
of the legislative intent in including "sex" as a classification in Title VII, see notes
42-49 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra
96. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
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harassment actionable, but finds non-sexual harassment directed
at one because of one's gender not violative of Title VII. But
harassment because of gender is limited by only the imagination
of the harasser and is not confined to sexual harassment. For ex-
ample, women have been harassed because of their gender by such
non-sexual acts as smashing their car headlights.98 Sexist but non-
sexual harassment may also be directed at women because of their
gender, as when a supervisor continuously calls a female employee
a "dumb broad" and asks her, "Why aren't you women home
where you belong?" 99 The courts have recognized that a woman
who is non-sexually harassed because she is a woman is no less
discriminated against because of her sex than a woman who is sex-
ually harassed because of her gender. 00
The EEOC should amend this guideline to make it clear that it
views sexual harassment as only one of the actionable types of
gender-based harassment. Without such an amendment, the
agency may fall deeper into the trap it has created. Already, in a
post-guideline sexual harassment decision, the EEOC has stated
that a supervisor's "use of profane language of a non-sexual
nature in the workplace does not constitute sexual harassment.
Although that language may have been unwanted or offensive to
the Charging Parties [who were all female], it would not constitute
sexual harassment if it was not of a sexual nature."'01 The facts of
this particular case showed that some male employees were also
exposed to the same language. 0 2 It is important to note, however,
that the EEOC stated that the language was not sexually harass-
ing because it was not sexual, and not because it affected
employees of both genders. Further, the EEOC did not take this
opportunity to point out that any harassment directed at females
because they were women would be "because of sex" under Title
VII.
98. Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. 1980); cf Bell v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (woman's car tires were slashed
and she was otherwise harassed by her co-workers because of her interracial
marriage).
99. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 42-43 ("photo-finishing girl" was harassed because
of her gender, not only in a sexual context, but also in a non-sexual context by com-
ments that women "can't be relied upon" and "don't know which end of a camera is
up").
100. E.g., Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1980).
101. EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6758, at 4809 (Apr. 3, 1981).
102. See id. at 4808.
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2. How the Guideline is Overinclusive
By failing to require an initial finding of disparate treatment
of employees of opposite sexes, the guideline would also make ac-
tionable sexual harassment that is directed at an employee for
some reason other than his or her gender. The guideline's defini-
tion of sexual harassment as "[ujnwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature"' °3 reflects a position that such conduct is per se
gender-based. The types of conduct which the guideline describes
as sexual harassment, however, need not be directed toward an
employee because of his or her sex. For example, verbal conduct of
a sexual nature, 0 4 if directed at and affecting both male and
female employees, would appear to be actionable under the guide-
lines, although it would not be discriminatory under Title VII. 05
The first three post-guideline EEOC decisions do not make it
clear whether the agency recognizes that Title VII, under the dis-
parate treatment theory, requires a comparison of the treatment
of males and females. Using identical language in all three deci-
sions, the EEOC stated: "The Commission and the courts have
recognized that sexual harassment is gender based discrimination
which violates Title VII, and that, where sexual considerations
are applied to one gender and not to the other, a case of sex dis-
crimination based on disparate treatment is established.' ' 0 6 If the
two clauses of this statement are read independently, it describes
alternative forms of sex discrimination: sexual harassment, which
is held to be per se gender-based, and disparate treatment. If, on
the other hand, the EEOC intended the two clauses to be read
together, the statement says that sexual harassment and dis-
parate treatment would be necessary to prove sexual harassment
violative of Title VII.
103. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
104. See id
105. Cf Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (acts of
quick-tempered supervisor who was equally hard on all employees, regardless of their
race, did not violate Title VII).
106. EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6758, at 4807 (Apr. 3, 1981)
(footnote omitted); EEOC Decision No. 81-17, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6757, at
4798 (Feb. 6, 1981) (footnote omitted); EEOC Decision No. 81-16, 2 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 6756, at 4796 (Jan. 26, 1981) (footnote omitted). In two of the three
decisions, the Commission compared treatment of men and women or pointed out
that there were no similarly situated employees. See EEOC No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 1 6758, at 4808 (Apr. 3, 1981); EEOC Decision No. 81-17, 2 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 6757, at 4799 (Feb. 6, 1981). In its third decision, however, the EEOC
stated that if a male charging party's male supervisor had laid off the charging party
for rejecting unwanted sexual advances, the Commission would find a Title VII viola-
tion. EEOC Decision No. 81-16, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6756, at 4796-97 (Jan.
26, 1981). The Commission did not discuss the possibility that female employees
might have been similarly situated.
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Of the two interpretations, only the second has a legitimate
basis in the law. It is supported by the EEOC's statement in one
post-guideline decision that "a discriminatory practice is unlawful
where it occurs because an individual is male or female.
' ' 107
Moreover, case authority recognizes that Title VII requires such a
showing of disparate treatment. For this reason the recent EEOC
decisions should be read to require disparate treatment in sexual
harassment cases, and future decisions should clarify this point.
3. Sexual Harassment and Disparate Treatment
If an individual is harassed, but not because of his or her race,
color, gender, religion, or national origin, there is no discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 1°8 Two situations in which harassment occurs
would therefore not be actionable: (1) if it were directed at one per-
son for personal, rather than class-based, reasons; 0 9 (2) if it were
or would be directed at all similarly situated employees, regard-
less of their class membership.110 With regard to the first instance,
as one court explained: "The fact that an individual is harassed oc-
casionally because he is unconventional and unduly sensitive or a
hypochondriac, or because he does not have a sense of humor, or
because people do not like him is not cognizable under the Civil
Rights Act." '' Similarly, for example, in order to make out a
prima facie case of illegal racial harassment, the plaintiffs must
show that they were harassed and that employees of another race
were not. If, instead, the evidence shows that employees of both
races were treated equally harshly, it has been held that there is
no racial discrimination under Title VII.
112
The courts have used the same approach in sexual harassment
cases. Williams v. Saxbe,"13 the first Title VII case to find sexual
harassment actionable, is typical. The plaintiff had alleged that,
107. EEOC Decision No. 81-16, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6756, at 4796 (Jan. 26, 1981).
108. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976); notes
58 & 59 supra.
109. Thus, adverse action taken by an employer against an employee because of a person-
ality clash, rather than because of the employee's gender, is not violative of Title VII.
Barding v. Board of Curators, 457 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
110. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
111. Fekete v United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
112. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affrd 4 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 32,160 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 1981); see Bradford v.
Sloan Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (acts of quick-tempered
supervisor who was equally hard on all employees, regardless of their race, did not
violate Title VII).
113. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd & remanded on other grounds sub nom
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decision on remand sub nom.
Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980).
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because she refused her supervisor's sexual advance, he wrong-
fully reprimanded her, refused to inform her of her job respon-
sibilities, refused to consider her recommendations, and ulti-
mately fired her from her job with the Justice Department.'1 4 In
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, Judge Richey of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia con-
cluded that, unless the supervisor in question were "a bisexual
and applied this criteria to both genders," the allegations showed
that the plaintiff had been discriminated against because of her
gender."' The test is whether a similarly situated person of the op-
posite sex was or would have been similarly harassed.
114. Id. at 655-56. Interestingly, responses to a federal survey indicate that, among
federal agencies, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and the
Department of Transportation have the highest incidence rates of sexual harassment
of women. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 6, 47.
115. 413 F. Supp. 654,659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd & remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decision on remand sub norm
Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980); accord Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 989 & n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 452, 468 (E.D. La. 1979). See generally Comment, Title VII: Legal Protec-
tion Against Sexual Harassmen 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 136 & n.62 (1977). But see
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (to hold that
sexual harassment of women violated Title VII would lead to the "ludicrous" result
that if men were similarly harassed there would be no basis for suit), vacated &
remanded mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) ; cf Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (sexual harassment of woman by male super-
visor not violative of Title VII because "[tihe gender lines might as easily have been
reversed, or even not crossed at all"), rev'd & remanded 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
In denying the motion to dismiss in Williams v. Saxbe, the judge made the prob-
lematic comment that the plaintiff's allegation "that the supervisor's conduct was a
policy or practice imposed on the plaintiff and other women similarly situated ...
[was] an essential allegation for presenting a cause of action." 413 F. Supp. at 660 n.8
(emphasis added). The Williams plaintiff would therefore have to prove that she had
been required to choose between providing sexual favors or being fired and that other
women had also been given the same choice, thereby indicating that the supervisor
had an ongoing policy of sexual extortion. The court's statement was in reaction to
the defendants' argument that, unless the complaint were dismissed, "the courts
[would] become embroiled in sorting out the social life of the employees of numerous
federal agencies." Id. at 660.
The opinion could be read to mean that unless more than one woman were victim-
ized, the harassment was not because of gender but perhaps because of her person-
ality or because of "chemistry" between her and the supervisor. Yet, if sexual harass-
ment by a supervisor of one female employee and not of a similarly situated male
employee is because of "sex," it remains so regardless of whether the supervisor also
harasses other female employees. In recent cases, the courts have rejected any in-
timation to the contrary in Williams. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 467 (E.D. Mich.
1977); see Note, Sexual Harassment & Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination
of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1024-25
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Sexual Harassment & Title VII]. These decisions are con-
sistent with other Title VII cases. In no other situation must an individual Title VII
plaintiff prove that others were discriminated against also. Evidence concerning
others may be relevant to counter a defendant's argument that adverse action was
taken against the plaintiff for some reason other than gender, race, color, religion, or
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This gender-based test also determines whether conduct in-
volving sexuality, sexual behavior, or sexual preference violates
Title VII, as is illustrated by two recent federal district court deci-
sions. In Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 116 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found no Title VII
sex discrimination when the plaintiff, other women, and men were
subjected to co-workers' extensive and explicit sexual cursing.
Another district court found actionable sexual harassment when
an employer sought sexual favors of a male homosexual employee,
because the employer would not have sought such favors of a
lesbian. 17
It is tempting to think that this requirement of comparing
similarly situated males and females is, in a word, silly. After all,
only a few men have filed charges of sexual harassment; 18 it would
seem to be almost exclusively a women's problem. There will be
very few, if any, cases in which both males and females are equally
sexually harassed. Yet the fact that meeting the requirement will
be almost always pro forma does not justify the EEOC's exceed-
ing its delegated powers by omitting that threshold step. On the
contrary, it shows that observing the statute's boundaries will
national origin. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804-05
(1973); Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,542 n.18 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981); Taylor v.
American Wholesalers, Inc., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8618, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1586 (D. Md. 1978). But see, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,708, at
14,693 n.1, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37, 38 n.1 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff's testimony re
garding boss's advances to women other than plaintiff admitted without objection in
plaintiff's case in chief).
116. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). A survey
by Impact Journal showed that 11% of the incidents reported involved harassment of
a woman by a woman. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note
2, at G-3.
118. See EEOC Decision No. 81-16, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6756 (Jan. 26, 1981)
(charging party's allegation that he was laid off because he rejected his male super-
visor's sexual advances was found to be unsupported by the evidence); Tybor, A
Homosexual Advance Leads to a Federal Case, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 3, col. 2
(discussing Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
in which the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss a Title VII claim where plain-
tiff alleged he was fired for rejecting homosexual supervisor's advances; court
reasoned that plaintiff would not have been approached had he been a female); Sexual
Harassment by Woman Alleged, The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 17, 1980, at A3, col. 3. See
also 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.62, at 8-104 & n.29 (rev. ed.
1980).
In a government survey released in September 1980, approximately 15% of the
male federal employees polled complained of sexual harassment. SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 3. One writer has asserted that,
because of sex roles, "[b]eing sexually subjected could be argued to be a woman's ex-
perience, whether the victim is a man or a woman." MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
229-30 n.13, 147. There is some indication that men, more so than women, are flat-
tered by sexual advances, but other evidence indicates that men are more uncomfort-
able, because of the sex role reversal, when they are pressured for dates. SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 23.
hurt only negligibly the EEOC's enforcement efforts against sex-
ual harassment. No doubt fewer cases would go unredressed
under Title VII as a result of requiring a male-female comparison
than do now because of the statute's nonapplication to employers
having fewer than fifteen employees." 9 The only way legitimately
to circumvent the limitations imposed by Title VII is for Congress
to amend the statute.
120
4. Disadvantage of Some Employees Because of
Others' Willingness to be Sexually Harassed
In a rather curious provision of the new guidelines, the EEOC
again failed to require a comparison of the treatment of males and
females. The provision concerns the question that arises when
someone other than the charging party complies with an
employer's sexual advance and receives favorable attention, such
as a promotion, in return. The EEOC has described this question
as "not... an issue of sexual harassment in the strict sense, [but]
... a related issue which would be governed by general Title VII
principles. 12 1 Specifically, the guideline provides that "[w]here
employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an
individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or re-
quests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for un-
lawful sex discrimination against other persons who were quali-
fied for, but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.
122
The EEOC again seems to interpret Title VII's reference to the
term "sex" to mean something sexual affecting an individual
rather than an individual's gender.
No cases have addressed the question, but it seems clear that
if the compliant employee is female and the boss is a heterosexual
male, a male co-worker who would otherwise have received the
promotion has been denied an employment opportunity because of
119. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
120. The EEOC has made the same error of failing to require that there be prohibited
class-based discrimination in its proposed guidelines on national origin harassment.
These guidelines do not require a plaintiff to show that similarly situated people of
another national origin are not likewise harassed. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85,637 (1980) (to
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(a)). The guidelines repeat much of the language of the
sexual harassment guidelines. The major difference is that they define illegal harass-
ment as "[elthnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an
individual's national origin." Id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b)). When
publishing the sexual harassment guidelines, the EEOC was careful to point out that
"[tjhe principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion, or national
origin." Id at 74,677 n.1.
121. Id. at 74,677.
122. Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g)).
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his gender.123 If the co-worker is female, however, she has not been
discriminated against because of her gender when the other
woman is promoted.124 The female co-worker has no standing to
complain 26 of sex discrimination. 26 An employer's use of sexual
criteria does not, as the EEOC intimates, per se violate Title VII.
5. Probable Supreme Court Reaction
It is unlikely that the EEOC's omission from the sexual
harassment guidelines of a requirement of comparison between
similarly situated males and females will be followed by the
Supreme Court. The 1976 case, General Electric Co. v. Gilber, 127
involved a similar threshold question: were female employees dis-
criminated against because of their sex when denied employer-
provided temporary disability insurance for all disabilities occur-
ring during pregnancy (even if unrelated to pregnancy), while male
123. It has been argued that this would be the result even if the women rejected the oppor.
tunity because men were denied that chance. Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra
note 115, at 1032. But one has to doubt whether, when Congress mandated equal
employment opportunity for both sexes, it meant equal opportunity to advance
oneself by entering into sexual liaisons.
124. Cf United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 373 (8th Cir. 1973) (a black re-
placed by a black cannot successfully argue that he has been discriminated against
because of race); Wade v. New York Tel. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(black female plaintiff alleging racial and sex discrimination in her firing failed to
show that she was replaced by or treated differently than someone of a different race
or sex). Contra, MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 197. This reasoning applies to disparate
treatment rather than disparate impact cases. See notes 34-38 and accompanying
text supra. Of course, the fact that only a specifically defined subclass of females is
disparately treated does not excuse the discrimination if it is gender-based. E.g.,
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
125. But cf, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir.) (white plaintiff's
right to nondiscriminatory environment gives her standing to complain of discrimi-
nation against blacks and Hispanics), cert denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); EEOC Deci-
sion No. 81-17, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6757, at 4799 (Feb. 6, 1981) (dicta)
(employer's affirmative duty to maintain a discrimination-free environment "extends
not only to those workers subjected to harassment, but also to those workers
affected by the harassment of others"); Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra note
115, at 1024 (sexual harassment damages all employees in the office); Note, Work
Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L.J. 1695, 1695 (1973)
("discriminatory practices directed at one group taint the work environment and
thereby cause injury to all employees").
126. But see Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976) (female plaintiff
was discriminated against because of sex even though another woman obtained the
promotion in question, because "if plaintiff had been a man she would not have been
treated in the same manner"). Nor may a defendant who has illegally fired one indi-
vidual because of gender simply immunize itself from liability by replacing that indi-
vidual with another of the same gender. See Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 462 F.
Supp. 828, 832-33 (D.S.D. 1978) (ultimate replacement of female plaintiff by another
woman had "minimal" relevance to plaintiff's sex discrimination claim); cf Wofford
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 470 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (evidence that black plain-
tiff was replaced by a black may not alone rebut a prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion but it supports a finding of a nondiscriminatory purpose).
127. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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employees were covered for all temporary disabilities? Although
EEOC guidelines stated that such discrimination because of preg-
nancy was illegal sex discrimination, the Supreme Court held that
there was no sex discrimination, because similarly situated (non-
pregnant) females and males were treated alike. 28 The Court thus
compared the treatment of men and women, even though the case
concerned the unique feminine attribute of the ability to become
pregnant. It held that the EEOC guidelines in question were ill-
reasoned 29 and declared that any deference due EEOC guidelines
is lessened when the agency's position has vacillated, as it had
with regard to the pregnancy-based discrimination issue. 30
By making no provision in the guidelines that the treatment
of similarly situated males and females be compared, the EEOC
deviates from its position in its homosexual and transsexual
discrimination decisions,31 and from the courts' unanimous agree-
ment' 2 that the word "sex" in Title VII means gender as opposed
to sexuality or carnality. Neither has found illegal sex-based ac-
tion without first discerning that there has been gender-based dis-
crimination: that similarly situated men and women are or would
128. Id at 133-40. The classification was not one of sex but one between" 'two groups -
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group [was] exclusively
female, the second include[d] members of bot h sexes.' "Id at 135 (quoting Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)). In reaching this result, the Court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that it was "the ability to become pregnant" from which
employment discrimination against women historically flowed. Id Arguably, the
Court retreated from this position in Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 434 U.S. 136 (1977),
where the majority held that certain types of discrimination against pregnant women
violated Title VII because they had the effect of denying pregnant women employ-
ment opportunity because of their sex.
129. 429 U.S. 125, 143-45 (1976).
130. Id at 142-43. This language in Gilbert may account for the EEOC's statement in the
supplementary information published with the interim sexual harassment guidelines
that "[slexual harassment like harassment on the basis of color, race, religion, or na-
tional origin, has long been recognized by EEOC as a violation of Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980). The
EEOC's assertion is supported by, for example, its filing of an amicus curiae brief in
support of the plaintiff-appellant in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 562 F.2d 55 (9th
Cir. 1977) (mem.). 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 153 n.25 (1976). The Court's emphasis in
Gilbert on the EEOC's inconsistency may well have contributed to the EEOC's
refusal to revise the sexual harassment guidelines concerning acts of supervisors and
agents. See text accompanying notes 224-25 infra. No doubt for the same reason, the
EEOC makes a prefatory statement in its guidelines on national origin discrimina-
tion that "[t]he Commission has consistently held that harassment on the basis of na-
tional origin is a violation of Title VII." 45 Fed. Reg. 85,636 (1980) (to be codified in
29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(a)).
131. See notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 51-59 and accompanying text supra.
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have been treated unequally.3 ' The EEOC's equation in the sex-
ual harassment guidelines of sex with sexual behavior, regardless
of whether the employer's conduct is aimed equally at males and
females, is therefore logically inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Gilbert and with lower courts' sexual harass-
ment decisions.1 3 4 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the earlier
EEOC pronouncements concerning discrimination against homo-
sexuals and transsexuals.' 31 Such an inconsistency, as the
Supreme Court pointed out in Gilbert, detracts from the per-
suasiveness of EEOC guidelines. After Gilbert when Congress
amended Title VII to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on
pregnancy, 36 it did not take that opportunity to say that the
Supreme Court was incorrect in comparing, in disparate treat-
ment cases, the treatment of men and women. Without a specific
133. But see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 6, 203. MacKinnon finds this disparate treat-
ment theory, which she describes as a "differences" approach, inadequate when deal-
ing with sexual harassment. She reasons that under this approach Title VII probably
would not be violated if both men and women were sexually harassed. Id MacKinnon
also finds the disparate impact theory (see note 36 supra) inadequate, although it is
conducive to her suggested theory, which she terms the "inequality" approach. Id. at
102. Women and men are not equal, MacKinnon argues, because of the culturally en-
forced inferiority of women. I. at 4-5, 102, 116-18. Further, men have much more
power in employment than do women. See i& at 9, 31, 92. MacKinnon notes that sex-
ual harassment is widespread and its "perpetrators tend to be men, the victims
women." Id. at 26-28. Because sexual harassment of women "integrally contributes
to the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position" based on gender, such
harassment would be per se actionable under the inequality theory. Id at 117,
174-82, 215-21, 231. Although no court has applied MacKinnon's inequality ap-
proach, her book was cited for another proposition in Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,534 (D.C. Cir. Jan 12, 1981).
Two theories, found by MacKinnon to be inadequate, have promise. One is the
theory that sexual harassment of a woman violates Title VII because it is discrimina-
tion based on a sex stereotype. See MACKINNON supra note 1, at 178-82. There is
dicta supportive of this approach. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) ("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes"), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978)
(referring to "stereotype of the sexually-accommodating secretary"); cf. 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 148, 158-59 (1976) (the "supervisor who makes repeated sexual advances to his
female employees . . . reinforces the traditional stereotype of women as the sub-
missive sex").
The second approach is the disparate impact theory. See note 36 supra. If an
employer sexually harasses all employees, male and female alike, but female
employees far outnumber similarly situated males or are reasonably more deeply af-
fected by the harassment, the affected females could argue that the sexual harass-
ment has a disparate impact on them. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 66, 183-84,
203, 206-08. The EEOC does not state in its guidelines under which, if any, of these
theories it feels sexual harassment violates Title VII.
134. See notes 113-15, 127-30 and accompanying text supr.
135. See notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
136. See note 48 and accompanying text supra
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provision, 1 7 such as the pregnancy amendment, exempting a par-
ticular type of discrimination from that analysis, the Court can be
expected to continue to compare treatment of the two genders. If
the requirement of a showing by a Title VII sexual harassment
plaintiff that similarly situated persons of the opposite sex were
not also harassed is felt to be Draconic, Congress can amend Title
VII so as to provide that sexual harassment is per se violative of
Title VII.
C. Significant Adverse Employment Ramifications
1. Harm to the Employee
In addition to proving that persons of the opposite sex were
not similarly treated, the Title VII plaintiff must also show that
the discrimination had significant adverse employment ramifica-
tions for him or her. To prove discrimination violative of subsec-
tion 703(a)(1) of the Act, the plaintiff must show that the discrimi-
nation occurred as a failure to hire or as a discharge or it otherwise
affected his or her "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.' ' 138 To prove discrimination violative of sub-
section 703(a)(2), the plaintiff must show that the discrimination
manifested itself in his or her being limited, segregated, or classi-
fied so as to deprive or tend to deprive the plaintiff of "employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee.' 1 39 With regard to this element, the guidelines provide
that sexual harassment is covered by Title VII if one of the follow-
ing applies:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
140
The first clause merely paraphrases the statutory language of
subsection 703(a)(1)141 without elucidating it.
The second clause, which provides that the EEOC would find
a Title VII violation when an employee's reaction to sexually
137. One author has suggested that statutes might be amended to prohibit discrimination
based on "sexuality," which may include sexual preference, as well as "sex."
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 190.
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
139. Id § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
140. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
141. See note 27 supra.
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harassing conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting the employee, 142 restates the rationale of well-reasoned
judicial interpretations of the statutory language of section
703(a)(2). 143 For example, a Title VII plaintiff who can show that
he or she was not hired or was fired in retaliation for spurning a
supervisor's advances can easily meet this element of significant
adverse employment ramifications. 144 A demotion or a denial of a
deserved promotion in retaliation for rejection of sexual overtures
would also clearly fit within the statutory scheme. 45 Similarly,
when harassment of an employee because of his or her gender
becomes so intolerable that a reasonable employee1 46 quits his or
142. The use of the plural "decisions" in the guideline, rather than the singular "decision,"
appears to be the result of an oversight. One decision, such as the decision to termi-
nate an employee, would clearly suffice. E.g., Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc.,
552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
143. See Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) ("the romantic overtures" by
the department chairman to the plaintiff, an assistant professor, "were but an unsat-
isfactory personal encounter with no employment repercussions and consequently
not actionable"); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in find-
ing abolition of plaintiff's job because she rejected her supervisor's advances action-
able, the court pointed out that the facts before it were "very different from instances
of sexual affairs between . . . employees which are not tied to employment oppor-
tunity in any way"); Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,385
(D.D.C. 1980) (no liability for sexual advances, offensive remarks, and touching of
plaintiff by boss with whom plaintiff did not work directly and who neither threat-
ened to nor did retaliate against her for her rejection of the advances) (decided before
Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand,
25 EmpL Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981), discussed at notes 159-70 and
accompanying text infra).
144. E.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd & remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decision on
remand sub nom. Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980).
145. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977); Rinkel v.
Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8331, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978).
146. The cases require that the plaintiff act reasonably. E.g., Clark v. World Airways,
Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980). The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has held, in a case involving alleged race discrimination, that a
black plaintiff who was discharged for absenteeism must show, in order to prevail, a
"proper excuse" for staying off the job "such as fear for personal safety, reasonably
based" on the threatening and harassing conduct of his co-workers. DeGrace v.
Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 806 (1st Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). In DeGrace, the court
added that "[wihile due allowance must be made for plaintiff's fear and hostility, he
too had to act reasonably to bring matters to [his employer's] attention, to communi-
cate his position, and to cooperate with or at least not impede [its) good faith efforts
to correct the situation." Id. (emphasis added); see Wright v. Allis-Chalmers, 496 F.
Supp. 349 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (black plaintiff could be properly fired for assaulting
supervisor even if the assault was occasioned by the supervisor's racial epithet);
EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980) (self-
help disfavored); cf Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of
Work-Related Sexual Harassment 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 192 (1980) (objective
standard of reasonableness applied to determine whether unemployment compensa-
tion claimant had good cause to leave job).
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her job, the courts should have no difficulty in finding that the
employee has been "constructively discharged" and has a cause of
action under Title VII.
147
The cases and the EEOC decisions are clear, however, that "a
nonemployment related personal encounter, '14 U even between an
employee and his or her supervisor, is not by itself actionable. The
EEOC has explained its position: "We simply do not share that
particularly jaundiced view of human nature that every sexual ad-
vance contains an implied threat that non-compliance will bring
forth employment retaliation.""' 9 In one court case, an assistant
professor at a college alleged that she had been fired after reject-
ing a superior's advance, but she failed to show any causal connec-
tion between the two events or even that the man in question had
played a role in her firing. 50 She was held not to have stated a
cause of action under Title VII.
The third clause of the guideline provides that sexual harass-
ment is illegal under Title VII when it "has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working en-
vironment. ' 151 This language reflects the EEOC's adoption of the
statements of a few courts and several commentators that Title
147. Cf Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (construc-
tive discharge because of atheism was illegal religious discrimination); Hayden v.
Chrysler Corp., 486 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (employer found responsible for
constructive discharge resulting from on-the-job racial harassment which was
intended to make it impossible for plaintiff to stay on the job). Contra, Shanks v. Har-
rington, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 590 (W.D. Iowa 1979) (alternative holding) (plain-
tiff, who alleged she had quit her job because of supervisor's repeated advances,
made to her because of her sex, had no Title VII cause of action); cf EEOC v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 388 (D. Minn. 1980) (self-help by
harassed employee disfavored when legal remedy available).
Twenty-six of the 130 sexual harassment charges sent to the EEOC's national
headquarters since publication of the sexual harassment guidelines were filed by
"women who quit when 'unwelcome sexual activity became intolerable.'" N. Y.
Times, Apr. 22, 1981, at C8, col. 1 (quoting J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Commissioner
of the EEOC).
148. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd & remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decision on remand
sub nom. Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980). Sexual attraction be-
tween co-workers is, after all, common. See Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 6
("some men find that the office is a little too exciting with women as peers"). See also
EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6758, at 4807-08,4809 (Apr.
3, 1981).
149. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 258-59 n.69 (quoting EEOC brief on appeal from
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd 568
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977)).
150. Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F. 2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979).
151. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)).
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VII imposes upon an employer a duty to provide each employee
with a discrimination-free environment in which to work. 162 The
theory germinated in the following dicta in Judge Goldberg's
plurality opinion 1 3 for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC,14 where the Spanish-surnamed
charging party alleged that she had been discriminated against on
152. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (dic-
ta) (a pattern of excessive and opprobrious ethnic insults would violate Title VII);
Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (dicta) (black plaintiffs'
claims of psychological harm resulting from "an atmosphere of discrimination"
caused by allegedly unlawful hiring practices, which also resulted in unfair discipline
of and work assignment for blacks, sufficient to give them standing); EEOC v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980) (employer
has duty to take action to provide for employee "a work environment free of racial
hostility, intimidation, and harassment" when "more than a few isolated incidents of
harassment.., have occurred"); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612,
631-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (black police officers entitled to work environment free of
racial abuse), modified on other grounds, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Lucido v. Cravath, Swain & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dicta)
(Italian plaintiff alleged national origin discrimination with regard to law firm's work
assignments, training, rotation, and outside work opportunities; court said Title VII
applies to "entire scope of the working environment"); see MAcKINNON, supra note 1,
at 40, 78; Kay & Brodsky, Protecting Women from Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place, 58 TEx. L. REV. 671, 691 (1980); Note, Job-Related Sexual Harassment & Union
Women: What Are Their Rights?. 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L.J. 929, 964-65 n.74 (1980);
Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra note 115, at 1021-22; Note, Legal Remedies
for Employment-Related Sexual Harassmen4 64 MINN. L. REV. 151,155 (1979); Note,
Work Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L.J. 1695 (1973). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to comment on the environ-
mental theory argument in one Title VII sexual harassment case, Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977), and decided the case on
a narrower ground.
The EEOC has consistently followed the discriminatory environment theory.
See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976); EEOC Deci-
sion No. 76-41, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6332 (1975) ("Title VII requires an
employer to maintain an atmosphere free of racial or ethnic intimidation"); EEOC
Decision No. 74-05, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6387, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 834
(1973) (employer responsible for constructive discharge of Spanish-surnamed
employee who quit because of atmosphere created by "kidding" of black co-workers);
Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Work-Related Sexual
Harassment 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 178 & n.30 (1980) (citing Brief Amicus
Curiae of the EEOC, Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
12, 1981), on remand 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981), discussed
in notes 159-70 and accompanying text infra).
The environmental theory is to be distinguished from the position taken in some
cases that evidence of other employees' chauvinistic conduct is admissible on the
issue of the employer's intent in taking adverse action against a harassed employee.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804-05 (1973) (evidence of
the employer's treatment of plaintiff and its general practice with respect to minority
employment may be relevant to any showing of pretext). The EEOC and one federal
district court have held that ongoing practices of addressing white female employees
as "Ms." or "Mrs." and black female employees by their first names themselves
violate Title VII. Johnson v. Lillie Rubin Affiliates, Inc., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8542,
at 7558, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 547, 548-49 (M.D. Tenn. 1973); EEOC Decision
71-32, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 866 (1970).
153. Judge Godbold specially concurred and Judge Roney dissented. Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
154. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
the basis of national origin because, although she worked with all
her employer's patients, the patients were segregated by national
origin: 5"
[I]t is my belief that employees' psychological as well as
economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection
from employer abuse, and that the phrase "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" in Section 703 is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective am-
bit the practice of creating a working environment heav-
ily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. One can
readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers .... 156
Judge Goldberg pointed out, however, that one ethnic epithet or
insult would not create a discriminatory atmosphere violative of
Title VII. 17 Those who subsequently embraced the theory have
stated that the plaintiff's burden of proof in a "discriminatory en-
vironment" case would be difficult to meet."1
8
The theory was recently adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bundy v. Jackson,"9
where a female employee alleged that she had been denied a pro-
motion because she rejected the sexual advances of her various
supervisors. The district court found that she was not denied the
promotion for that reason, but rather because of her lack of
qualifications, 60 and went on to hold that the fact that the male
supervisors considered making sexual propositions to their female
155. Id at 236-37. The issue before the court was whether the individual's charge filed
with the EEOC entitled the EEOC to investigate the employer's patient records. Id
at 239. The court held the investigation proper because the EEOC might possibly
discover something relevant to employment discrimination against the charging
party. Judge Goldberg specifically stated that he was not deciding whether dis-
crimination existed: "[A]ssuming that patient segregation can be found to exist, I
leave to another day a judicial evaluation of its effect on the employment conditions
of the company's employees." Id at 241.
156. Id at 238.
157. Id; see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 999 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (proper to require
employer to be responsible for and order to stop "persistent racial epithets" by a
supervisor because "name-calling of any kind is close to abuse") (emphasis added).
158. See generally 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.66 (rev. ed. 1980).
159. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec.
31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
160. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9154, at 7007 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd & remanded, 24 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,710
(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
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employees "standard operating procedure" was insufficient to
violate Title VII.161 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the
record contained evidence that the supervisors had, for example,
made negative job evaluations of the plaintiff only after she had
rejected their advances, that they "at least created the impression
that they were impeding her promotion because she had offended
them, and they certainly did nothing to help her pursue her
harassment claims through established channels.116 2 Relying on
Rogers, Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright, in his opinion for the court,
wrote that, unless "sexual harassment, which injects the most de-
meaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment
and which always represents an intentional assault on an individ-
ual's innermost privacy," is illegal, "an employer could sexually
harass a female employee with impunity by carefully stopping
short of firing the employee or taking any other tangible actions
against her in response to her resistance, thereby creating the im-
pression that the employer did not take the ritual of harassment
and resistance 'seriously.' "1163 The court of appeals in Bundy
found that the plaintiff's work environment was so oppressive
that it was actionable per se. 164
It is important to note that Bundy does not support the
proposition that any sexual harassment, no matter how slight,
violates Title VII because it poisons the environment. The plain-
tiff in Bundy had proved persistent, ongoing propositioning of
161. Id. at 7006-07. The court found that the plaintiff had been annoyed but not insulted
by the advances, which her supervisors considered a "game" that none of them took
seriously, and that because her rejection of them resulted in no adverse employment
ramifications there had been no violation of Title VII. Id When the plaintiff ap-
pealed, both the EEOC and the Women's Legal Defense Fund filed amicus curiae
briefs urging reversal of the district court's decision. Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,529 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981).
162. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,439, at 18,530 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
163. Id at 18,534.
164. Finding the harassment actionable, the Bundy court went on to say that, with regard
to the plaintiff's claim that she had been improperly denied an employment opportun-
ity, once she had shown such an oppressive environment, she was entitled to a more
relaxed burden of proof than she would otherwise have been required to meet. Id. at
18,537-39. The court adjusted the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804 (1973), formula for establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrim-
ination so that the plaintiff need not show
as part of her prima facie case that other employees who were no better qual-
ified, but who were not similarly disadvantaged, were promoted at the time
she was denied a promotion.... We simply require the plaintiff to show that
according to the employer's formal rules she was eligible for promotion and
that, within the context of the employer's actual practical pattern of promo-
tion, she had a reasonable expectation of the promotion she sought.... ITihe
employer would then have to show by clear and convincing evidence that ....
it set qualification criteria for promotion more stringent than the employee
could meet.
24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,539 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
her. When she complained to the harassers' boss, he was not only
unsympathetic, but he also propositioned her.16 The plaintiff
testified that she suffered serious emotional harm from the
harassment.1 66 She also introduced evidence that other women
were similarly harassed by her supervisors. 6 7 The court stated
that "the sexual harassment of the sort Bundy suffered"'16
amounted by itself to sex discrimination with respect to the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because such a
holding "follows ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title
VII violations where an employer created or condoned a sub-
stantially discriminatory work environment.' 1 9 The facts in
Bundy, where a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would
rightfully have been Seriously upset, reveal a "working environ-
ment heavily charged with ... discrimination"'' 0 of the type to
which Judge Goldberg alluded in Rogers.
Both the interim and the final EEOC guidelines endorse the
discriminatory environment theory of Rogers applied by the court
of appeals in Bundy. Under the interim guideline, a sexually
harassed employee would have had a cognizable claim even
though the harassment did not trigger an employment decision
concerning him or her, if it had "the purpose or effect of substan-
tially interfering with that individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment." 17' Before it had the benefit of the court of appeals' decision
in Bundy, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia considered this interim guideline in another sexual
harassment case, Clark v. World Airways, Inc.172 Although the
plaintiff in Clark argued that she had been constructively dis-
charged when she quit her job after an executive made a pass at
her on an out-of-town training trip, the court found that she had
left her employment for other reasons. It also held that the harass-
ment she proved was insufficient -to amount to a discriminatory
environment under the EEOC's interim guidelines, because after
the plaintiff completed the "brief orientation period" she was to
have "little day-to-day contact" with the man in question.1 73 Be-
165. The boss told Bundy that he would like to "get her into bed" himself and that "any
man in his right mind would want to rape" her. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9154, at 7006
(D.D.C. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12,
1981). on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
166. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,531 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
167. Id at 18,540 n.3.
168. Id at 18,532 (emphasis added).
169. Id (emphasis omitted and emphasis added).
170. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
171. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1980).
172. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980).
173. Id at 18,292-93 n.11.
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cause the harassment in Clark was confined to one incident that
implied no threat of retaliation, Clark is easily distinguishable
from Bundy.
The final EEOC guideline on this point is identical to the in-
terim one examined in Clark, except that the word "substantially"
is replaced by "unreasonable. '1 74 Under the final guidelines, then,
an employee has a cause of action if sexual harassment "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.' '
175
2. De Minimus Harm
By requiring that "environmental discrimination" be unrea-
sonable before it is actionable, the EEOC recognizes that there
can be discrimination too slight to be the basis of a cognizable
Title VII claim. Although no post-guideline court cases other than
Bundy and Clark have directly raised this issue, courts in pre-
guideline cases have held that Congress did not intend to outlaw
all gender-based disparate treatment affecting employment, but
only treatment which significantly affects an individual's employ-
ment opportunities or conditions of employment. 176 Courts have
174. The supplementary information accompanying the final guidelines provided this
cryptic explanation of the change: "Many commentators raised questions as to the
meaning of the word 'substantially.' The word 'unreasonably' more accurately states
the intent of the Commission and was therefore substituted to clarify that intent." 45
Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
175. Id at 74,677 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)) (emphasis added). The United
States District Court for the District of North Dakota has held that a supervisor's
touching the plaintiff's breasts and buttocks and, when inebriated, making a pass at
her did not amount to a discriminatory environment actionable under the guidelines.
Walter v. KFGO Radio, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 982, 986-87 (D.N.D. Aug. 4, 1981).
The plaintiff had never complained about the conduct and she had received proper
salary raises and a promotion. Id.
176. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-91 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (distinguishing sexual
harassment cases from "long hair" cases because the latter involve something
"minor" that does not "pose distinct employment disadvantages for one sex"); Smith
v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 20 EmpL Prac. Dec. 1 30,165, at 11,847, 20 Fair EmpL Prac.
Cas. 724, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (foreman's verbal passes at female plaintiff "did not
rise to such a level as to constitute a Title VII violation" in the absence of his retalia-
tion against her for her rejection of them); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1389-90 (D. Colo. 1978) (to be actionable under Title VII, sexual harass-
ment must "substantially" affect one's employment, which condition was met when
plaintiff was fired); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 463 (E.D.
Mich. 1977) (asking whether, if it recognizes a cause of action for sexual harassment,
"flirtations of the smallest order" will give rise to Title VII liability) (citing Miller v.
Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. CaL 1976), rev'd & remanded, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979)); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976) ("assum-
ing [as suggested by case holding that short hair requirement for male employees
does not violate the Act) Title VII permits a weighing of the effect of a particular
policy ... , Court could not find the instant policy or practice to have an insignificant
effect"), rev'd & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978), decision on remand sub nom. Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387
(D.D.C. 1980); see Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment & Employer Liability: The Flirta-
tion that Could Cost a Fortune, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 277, 285 (1980); 17 S. TEx. L.J.
409, 412 (1976).
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concluded in non-harassment cases, for example, that an
employer's allowing women to wear their hair longer than could
men' 77 or allowing men to wear slacks but requiring women to
wear skirts17 is so de minimus as to be non-actionable. The con-
sensus of the courts today is that an employer may impose dif-
ferent grooming and dress standards on males and females as long
as the standards are reasonable) 79
The EEOC's sexual harassment guidelines evidence
awareness of the possible de minimus problem by providing that
[i]n determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sex-
ual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as
a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as
the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination
of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.8 0
This caveat was made necessary by the vagueness of the section
of the guidelines defining sexual harassment. For example, the
language concerning "verbal conduct of a sexual nature"'81 that is
a "term or condition' 182 of one's employment arguably sanctions
charges of sex discrimination when co-workers tell risque jokes in
order to make someone blush or when one person, in insulting
177. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(newspaper's refusal to hire a male with shoulder-length hair while it would hire a
female with long hair permissible). But see Hubbard v. Ben Dyer Assoc., 6 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 8730, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 36 (D. Md. 1973) (court should consider
whether job in question requires contact with customers). On the other hand, the
EEOC has taken the position that disparate treatment of men and women with long
hairper se violates Title VII. 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.11, at
8-83 & n.15 (rev. ed. 1980); id. § 41.11, at 8-84 n.17 (Supp. 1980).
178. Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979). But see Carroll
v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (bank violated Title
VII by permitting male employees to wear business suits, but requiring women to
wear uniforms), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
179. E.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (require-
ment that only male employees wear neckties did not violate Title VII). See generally
1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 10.00-17.00 (rev. ed. 1980); Annot., 27
A.L.R. Fed. 274 (1976). This reflection of community standards is permitted even
though generally customer preference cannot validate sex discrimination. Fernandez
v. Wynn Oil Co., 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. 32,060 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1981) (if woman had
been denied job of director of international marketing because of her sex, such denial
would not be excused by fact that some customers in South America would not do
business with a woman); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.)
(female sex not a BFOQ for stewardesses' job description), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1980) (EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination).
180. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)). In a recent deci-
sion, the EEOC stated that this language reflects its position that a purely personal
relationship cannot in itself violate Title VII. EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6758. at 4808 (Apr. 3, 1981).
181. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
182. Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)).
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another, uses a sexual term, or an employer comments to his or
her employee on the attractive physique of a stranger passing by
on the street outside the office. If that were so, the guideline
would make it possible for an unreasonable employee to harass an
employer, rather than vice-versa, by charging it with commission
of a de minimus wrong.
Yet even the most liberal judicial readings of Title VII, such
as that by the court of appeals in Bundy, have found a Title VII
violation because of a discriminatory environment only when the
employer had participated in clearly non-trivial harassment which
had the effect of substantially and unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiff's work.1 3 In the Bundy appeal, which was decided
after the final guidelines took effect, Chief Judge Wright noted
that the guidelines defined sexual harassment broadly. He none-
theless recognized that casual or isolated manifestations of a
discriminatory environment, such as a few ethnic or racial slurs,
may be too inconsequential to give rise to a Title VII cause of
action. 184
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, in Brown v. City of Guthrie, s5 construed the guidelines
in a similarly reasonable manner when it found that the intoler-
able conditions the plaintiff had been subjected to, which con-
tributed to her resignation, constituted a discriminatory environ-
ment violative of Title VII. The Brown facts illustrate what the
EEOC might have had in mind when it proscribed not only
"[uinwelcome sexual advances [and] requests for sexual favors"
but also "other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.'
8 6
183. See notes 176-79 and accompanying text supra.
184. Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,535, 18,540 n.9 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981). Similarly,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a
supervisor's calling an Italian-American employee a "dago" and casually referring to
other Italian-American employees as "the Mafia" do not violate Title VII. Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Ac-
cord, Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 383 (E.D. Va. 1977) ("infrequent insults
do not a Title VII case make"), aff'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978). The EEOC, however,
found cause to believe that racial discrimination had occurred when a district
manager used the term "nigger" in a joke at the close of a training program. See
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 211 (citing [1973] EEOC Decisions (CCH) 6346 (1972)).
185. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
186. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). Employees have
in the past complained of crude comments, jokes, and exposure to sexy or sexist pic-
tures. E.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); Neeley v.
American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Empl Prac. Dec. 1 8395, 17 Fair EmpL Prac.
Cas. 482 (W.D. Okla. 1978). One eighteen-year-old woman's employer repeatedly
described to her the intimate details of his marriage and asked her opinion of dif-
ferent sexual positions. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 29. Reported sexual behavior
runs the gamut from a man's staring at a woman to exposing himself to her. Lublin,
Resisting Advances: Employers Act to Curb Sex Harassing on Job; Lawsuits, Fines
Feared Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 20, cols. 2 & 3.
The plaintiff's shift commander at a police station had approached
her twice at work and asked her to take her clothes off, had shown
her "girlie" magazines and asked her to compare herself to the
nude women pictured in them, and had repeatedly viewed, in her
presence, a videotape of her searching a naked female prisoner,
while he commented upon the prisoner's physical attributes.'8
When she complained to the police chief, he told her she was over-
reacting. 88 The outrageous facts of Brown make it clear that the
plaintiff reacted reasonably and was not a particularly thin-
skinned or testy employee.
In cases concerning complaints of racial, religious, or national
origin harassment by co-workers who made bigoted comments or
jokes, several courts have emphasized that Title VII was not
enacted to shelter individuals from every unpleasantness en-
countered in the employment setting.8 9 One court explained:
There has been evidence that plaintiff was subjected to
treatment by fellow employees that might be offensive to
one of sensitive feelings and might be ignored by
others ....
... Against a large part of the frictions and irritations
and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in
a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide
is a better protection than the law ever could be.1 90
187. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627, 1629 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
188. Id at 1631.
189. See Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281, 283 (10th Cir. 1978) (employer "can-
not be an insurer against all racial insults and racial incidents" so as to guarantee a
workplace "completely sterile of... prejudice") (quoting opinion of the trial judge);
Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 382 (E.D. Va. 1977) ("Any organization... has
its tensions, friction, and 'belly aching,' and some of it will be because of racial dif-
ferences. But this fact of life does not indict defendants [employers] who have abun-
dantly shown that they have striven to reduce racial tension and correct instances of
unfairness related to race. Defendants [employers] cannot be faulted for failing to
create a perfect world."), afrd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Walker v. Columbia Univ.,
407 F. Supp. 1370, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (employees' "residuary 'male chauvinism'...
does not make a pattern or practice chargeable to an employer"); Howard v. National
Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 605-06 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1973). But see EEOC Decision
No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 295 (1969) (Polish employee offended by
co-workers' Polish jokes had cause of action even though others of same national
origin were not offended).
190. Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 605-06 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(quoting without comment Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936)). When, on the other hand, the plaintiff is
a sensitive individual but the discrimination complained of would be objectionable to
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That approach is consistent with even the most liberal Title VII
cases, Rogers and Bundy, and with the policy behind the common
law rules that one cannot recover for a mere insult 9 ' and that the
tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
provide redress for trivialities.'92 Undoubtedly, part of the courts'
motivation is the thought that the need to judicially right such
minor wrongs is outweighed by the concomitant expense to the
public. In addition, these holdings further one of the policies
behind the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech,
which is the provision of a safety valve through which aggression
can be vented verbally rather than through physical violence. 93
Similarly, if a sexual insult is uttered in the heat of anger during a
personal conflict, it should not give rise to a Title VII suit.
The third clause of the guideline provides that conduct which
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment '19 4 constitutes action-
a reasonable person, the plaintiff has a cause of action. E.g., Rice v. Litton Sys., Inc.,
7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9354, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 76 (D.D.C. 1974) (employer liable
for employees' discrimination against black plaintiff with regard to vacation and
workload, despite the fact that "plaintiff [was] an extremely sensitive individual
quick to attribute callousness to race prejudice"), affd mem., 530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir.
1976); cf. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 486 F. Supp. 894, 936, 942 (D.N.J. 1978) (the
fact that a "weaker, more pleasant, less demanding person ... might well have capitu-
lated" does not excuse the harassment; supervisors wrongly regarded plaintiff, the
target of sexual remarks and cartoons by her co-workers, "as an over-sensitive
woman who should be expected to meet and endure all this in 'a man's working
world' ").
191. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 744, 565 P.2d 1173, 1178
(1977) (en banc) (Stafford, J., concurring in result); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (4th ed. 1971).
192. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 380 A.2d 611, 615 (1977). In Harris, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland stated:
"[Njot... every emotional upset should constitute the basis of an action. In-
discriminate allowance of actions for mental anguish would encourage neu-
rotic overreactions to trivial hurts, and the law should aim to toughen the
psyche of the victim rather than pamper it. But a line can be drawn between
the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the severe
mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in social
utility."
Id. at 571, 380 A.2d at 617 (quoting Knierim v. Izzo, 211 Ill. 2d 75, 85, 174 N.E.2d
157, 164 (1961)). The court also cited with approval a California case that held that a
black employee, who had been called "nigger," whose union status had been ignored,
and who had been fired without cause, had a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id at 569-70, 380 A.2d at 615-16 (citing Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'r, Inc., 2 CaL 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 96 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970)).
193. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel & Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 949 (1968).
194. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
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able sexual harassment. The EEOC's use of the modifier "unrea-
sonably" indicates its cognizance of the fact that a particular sex-
ual comment or action could be so de minimus as to not by itself
constitute a term or condition of employment under Title VII. In
view of this, the word "unreasonably" should be read to modify
"intimidating, hostile, or offensive" as well as "interfering. "'95
In an apparent inconsistency with the EEOC's recognition
that de minimus wrongs are not actionable, the guideline seems to
require only that the conduct have either the purpose or the effect
of creating the undesirable results. If these are intended to be
alternative bases for causes of action, the statute would be
violated if a sexual remark or action has the effect of unreasonably
interfering with the target's work performance or intimidating or
offending him or her, regardless of the actor's intent. That makes
sense and is consistent with the developing case law.196 Further,
Title VII would be violated if the speaker or actor has the purpose
of or intends to interfere with, intimidate, or offend the other
unreasonably but fails to do so. Perhaps the EEOC intended to
discourage sexual harassment as much as possible by telling the
employer, "Don't even try it!" But the guideline should not be ap-
plied to give a person standing to bring a Title VII complaint if
the employer intended to offend or upset the employee but failed
to do so. There would be no basis for finding a violation of Title
VII in the absence of harm to anyone. The EEOC implicitly recog-
nized that there must be harm in order for there to be a cause of
action when it provided that only unwelcome sexual conduct is ac-
195. Otherwise, the guideline would hold the employer responsible if sexual conduct "has
the purpose or effect of... creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working en-
vironment" for a particularly sensitive or testy employee. The guideline should be
read to avoid that result. Cf., e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("in
interpreting legislation, 'we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object' ");
Condon v. Finch, 305 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.N.H. 1969) ("legislative grammar often falls
short of accurately expressing the legislative intent").
196. See notes 162-70, 185-89 and accompanying text supra.
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tionable. 197 Explicit recognition of this point is found in the Com-
mission's statement in the supplementary information accom-
panying the interim guidelines: "Interim § 1604.11(b) recognizes
that the question of whether a particular action or incident
establishes a purely personal social relationship without a discrim-
inatory employment effect requires a factual determination."''98
The EEOC must be especially careful to make clear that
neither trivial charges nor claims regarding acts from which no
harm resulted will be found to be actionable Title VII violations.
This clarification is particularly important in the area of harass-
197. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). The guidelines'
proscription of "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" is worded so that it is arguable that
"unwelcome" does not modify "requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature." The guidelines must, of course, be read as if
"unwelcome" is repeated before "requests" and before "verbal," so as to avoid the
absurd result that sexual remarks or caresses are actionable by the recipient, even
when he or she welcomes them. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 356
(1973) ("context is important in the quest for the word's meaning"); Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (courts may deviate from a literal interpretation of a
statute if it would lead to absurd results).
Although the guidelines say nothing about how the determination is made as to
whether particular sexual conduct was unwelcome, the only court that has con-
sidered the question suggested that "one isolated incident or a mere flirtation" might
not suffice because the instigator might not realize that his or her advance would be
unwelcome. Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627, 1632 (W.D.
Okla. 1980); cf 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 164 n.76 (1976) (only an "extreme or coercive"
isolated advance should be held to violate Title VII). The Brown court would inquire
beyond the complainant's assertion that the advance was unwelcome and would con-
sider relevant the fact that the person making the advance reasonably believed that
it would be welcome. Under this interpretation of the guideline, the EEOC and the
courts could consider such facts as whether the plaintiff accompanied the alleged
harasser to his or her apartment for a nightcap and "snuggled up" to the alleged
harasser before the advance was made. Subsection (b) of the EEOC guidelines, prom-
ising consideration of the circumstances of the advance, would then come into play.
45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)). For example, in
one charge filed with the EEOC, the complainant explained that, because she felt
sorry for her supervisor, she had let him visit her at her home but refused to submit
to his sexual advances. Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra note 115, at 1016 n.78.
The supervisor in this case might have reasonably thought the plaintiff would be
receptive. Cf. Caldwell v. Hodgeman, 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (26 Empl. Prac.
Dec.) 1 31,932 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 6, 1981) (after quitting, claimant returned to place
of employment and visited harasser). In considering such facts, the EEOC would look
at the "totality of the circumstances." 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
In other areas of the law, too, consideration is given to the reasonableness of the
actor's belief that the act is welcome. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 10, at 37 (4th ed. 1971) (battery). But see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 46, 48,
54-55, 286-87 n.87 (suggesting that a reasonable woman's response, such as of intim-
idated silence, might be different from what a reasonable man expects). Such con-
siderations of reasonable expectations may have led the court in Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 982 (D.N.D. Aug. 4, 1981), to find no actionable
harassment when the plaintiff did not complain to the harasser or any one else about
his sexual advances. See note 175 supra.
198. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,024 (1980) (emphasis added).
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ment, when the subject matter of the charge easily lends itself to
fabrication concerning what occurred behind closed doors.' 9"
Employers wary of such claims may find some solace in subsec-
tion (b) of the guidelines, which promises that the EEOC will con-
sider all facts, "such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred. '20 0 The EEOC
should soon judicially gloss the guideline to make it clear that
merely intended but ineffective harassment or trivial unpleasant-
ness does not give rise to a Title VII cause of action.
Recently, the EEOC has taken a step in that direction. The
only Commission decision to date that construes subsection (a)(3)
of the guidelines presented outrageous facts that did not raise the
issue of de minimus wrongs. The director of a correctional youth
camp was found to have engaged in a pattern of soliciting sexual
favors from and making unwanted vulgar remarks to many of his
female employees, including the four charging parties.20 1 When the
women refused him, he took retaliatory action against them, such
as giving them poorer evaluations than they had previously
received.0 2 The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe there had
been violations not only of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2),203 but also
of subsection (a)(3) because "the Director habitually made un-
199. But see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 96-97 (arguing that women are loath to com-
plain even where the injury is real).
It has been asserted that frivolous Title VII sexual harassment suits will be de-
terred because courts may, upon finding a suit frivolous, order a plaintiff to pay the
defendant's attorneys' fees. Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra note 115, at 1034.
The author knows of no complainants who have been ordered to pay an employer's
costs incurred in defending itself before the EEOC, although such an order would be
appropriate. The EEOC has occasionally been ordered to pay the employer's at-
torneys' fees. E.g., EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1532,
1592-95 (E.D. Va. 1979). Employers have been ordered to pay a prevailing charging
party's attorneys' fees for work performed at the federal and state agency stage. See
Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff, whose suc-
cess in state administrative proceedings led to dismissal of federal court Title VII
claim, was entitled to attorneys' fees under Title VII), aff'd, 447 U.S. 54 (1980);
Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406,410 (1st Cir. 1978) ("a party who has prevailed on the
merits of a discrimination complaint in administrative proceedings . . . may be
granted fees by a federal district court under section 706(k)"); Parker v. Califano, 561
F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Congress intended to award fees for work done at adminis-
trative as well as judicial proceedings); Johnson v. United States, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec.
1 11,039 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1977). But, because the evidence
will often amount to a "swearing contest" of one person's word against the other, a
finding of frivolity is unlikely. Similarly, if a plaintiff mistakenly believes that he or
she was harassed because of his or her sex, the suit would not have been frivolously
filed. Cf McCampbell v. Chrysler Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (no
bad faith shown in plaintiff's charge that blacks were disciplined more strictly than
whites, when plaintiff believed this to be true and there was conflicting evidence).
200. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
201. EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6758, at 4808-09 (Apr. 3,
1981).
202. Id at 4809-12.
203. 1I at 4809-10.
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wanted statements of a sexually explicit nature directly to, in
reference to, or degrading to Charging Parties A, B, C, and D and
other female employees which created an intimidating and offen-
sive working environment."2 4 But the Commission was careful to
point out that "the use of generally vulgar language of a sexual
nature, not directly to or about women, in an employment situa-
tion will not always constitute sexual harassment. '"205 It stated
that, absent the other conduct found to be sexually harassing, the
director's sexual remarks made in the presence of, but "not made
directly to, in reference to, or degrading to" the charging parties
would not constitute sexual harassment.206
D. Harassment by the Employer
The final requirement which must be satisfied in order for dis-
crimination to be actionable under section 703 is that the alleged
illegal conduct be committed by an employer 20 7 covered by the
Act.20 Title VII defines employer as including "any agent" of
such an employer.209 The question thus arises as to when an act
will be considered that of an employer or its agent. Clearly the
employer cannot be held liable for the behavior of everyone an
204. Id at 4809. The director made such statements as "I am hot after your body" and
"You're lucky I have my hands full, because if I didn't, I'd grab your [breasts] and
put them in my mouth." Id at 4802, 4804.
205. Id at 4809.
206. Id In that case, however, the director's remarks contributed to an offensive work en-
vironment that had been "created by the Director's other lewd activities." Id
207. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
208. See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
209. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Some courts have held
that the agent is individually answerable as an employer under Title VII. Stringer v.
Commonwealth, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157, 158, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (harasser vested with managerial responsibilities
was individually liable as agent); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
10,135 (D. Md. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Padilla v.
Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D.N.M. 1974); see Sexual Harassment & Title VII,
supra note 115, at 1030-31. But cf Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 4 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 32,138 (D.N.J. June 17, 1981) (mere non-super-
visory co-worker would not be agent so as to be liable under Title VII for sexual
harassment). Because of problems of governmental immunity, plaintiffs are likely to
name individual supervisors as defendants if the employer is a governmental entity.
E.g., Wong v. Jones, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,428 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Shanks v. Har-
rington, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 590, 591 (N.D. Iowa 1979). The statutory language
is more plausibly construed to mean only that a person otherwise an employer under
Title VII is responsible not only for his or her acts, but also for those of his or her
agent. If the malefactor acted as the employer's agent, then the employer is liable and
there is no need to hold the agent individually liable as well. Moreover, with the ex-
ception of injunctive relief, the equitable remedies envisioned by the Act, such as hir-
ing, back pay, and reinstatement, are enforceable only against the employer. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
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employee encounters. Sexual harassment of an employed person is
not necessarily confined to the employment setting.210 For exam-
ple, an employee may be the target of crude comments by con-
struction workers, prostitutes, or even school children met en
route to work. The initial line of employer responsibility should be
drawn at the door of the place where the employer requires the
employee to work. Yet, even there Title VII does not hold the
employer liable for all acts of everyone with whom an employee
comes in contact: the individual employer, supervisors, co-
workers, customers, clients, other business invitees, and
trespassers.
The guidelines contain four provisions regarding liability and
responsibility of employers. In the first, an employer is held
strictly liable for sexual harassment by its agents and supervisory
employees.2 1 The EEOC thus adopted the most liberal judicial
position on this issue. With regard to the employer's liability for
harassment of employees by their co-workers, the second provi-
sion follows the mainstream of case law: the employer is liable if it
has actual or constructive notice of the problem and fails to take
appropriate corrective measures. 212 The EEOC appears to break
new ground in the third provision by applying that same standard
to harassment of employees by non-employees, although the Com-
mission promises to take all circumstances into account in deter-
mining whether the employer is liable.213 In the final provision, the
EEOC urges employers to take preventive measures against sex-
ual harassment.214 The employer who takes such measures,
however, is not rewarded by a release from its strict liability for
the acts of its supervisory employees and its agents.2 15
210. See, e.g., Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (complaint of female
students that sexual harassment by professors violated Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) dismissed); Wehrwein, Sex Charges Filed
Against Newly Resigned Iowa Judge, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (ex-judge in-
dicted for forcibly soliciting sexual favors from a woman scheduled to appear before
him on bad check charges); TIME, Feb. 4, 1980, at 84 (complaints by female college
students of sexual harassment by male professors); cf McCord, Two at UMBC Tied
to Slurs to Keep Jobs, The Sunday Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 5, 1981, at B1, col. 1 (univer-
sity athletic department employees accused of making racial slurs to students).
211. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)).
212. Id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)).
213. Id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
214. Id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
215. See id (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(c)). The EEOC has subsequently referred
to the guidelines as providing for "strict liability for the acts of agents and super-
visory employees." EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6758, at
4808, 4810 (Apr. 3, 1981).
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1. Employer's Liability for Acts of Its Agents
and Supervisory Personnel
In order for a person's act to fall within the scope of Title VII,
the actor must be either the employer or its agent. 16 Certainly an
individual employer is liable for his or her own acts and for the
acts of others he or she ratifies. The greater difficulty is in deter-
mining when another acts as the employer's agent. The EEOC
guideline provides as follows:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer.... is
responsible for its acts and those of its agents and super-
visory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were
authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regard-
less of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence.
21 7
It seems that the EEOC considers supervisory personnel to be
agents of the employer; yet there would be no need to specify both
agents and supervisory employees if the two terms were simply
interchangeable. The conclusion that they are not synonymous is
further supported by the guidelines' provision that the EEOC
"will examine the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the job functions performed by the individual in
determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or
agency capacity.' '218
In response to requests for clarification of the term "agent"
as identically used in the interim guidelines, the EEOC stated,
" 'Agent' is used in the same way here as it is used in § 701(b) of
Title VII where 'agent' is included in the definition of
'employer.' "219 Section 701(b), however, provides only that an
employer is responsible for the acts of its agents; Title VII does
not define the term.220 Because the guidelines set forth other
specific rules concerning non-agent "fellow employees ' '221 and
"non-employees, ' ' 222 the EEOC may have included agents in the
provision concerning supervisors as a catch-all for non-supervi-
sory personnel who are clearly part of the management. For exam-
216. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(b), 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b),
2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
217. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)). The guideline is silent as
to any question of individual liability of the supervisor or agent involved. See note
209 supra.
218. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)).
219. Id, at 74,676.
220. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
221. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)).
222. Id, (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
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ple, a corporate employer should generally be answerable for the
acts of its top officers and members of the board,223 regardless of
whether they are technically supervisory personnel.
Despite having received many comments criticizing an iden-
tical provision in the interim guidelines mandating strict liability
for conduct of agents and supervisory employees as "too broad
and unsupported by case law, ' ' 224 the EEOC stood by that ap-
proach. In rejecting this criticism, the EEOC stated that "the
Commission and the courts have held for years that an employer
is liable if a supervisor or an agent violates Title VII, regardless of
knowledge or any other mitigating factors. '22 The statement is
accurate as to the EEOC's position with regard to supervisors'
acts 226 and as to the courts' position in non-harassment cases.
Court decisions in sexual harassment cases, however, have not
mirrored the EEOC's viewpoint.
While courts have held in non-harassment Title VII cases that
employers are generally liable for their supervisors' acts,2 27 they
have been divided on that issue in sexual harassment cases. A few
early decisions viewed sexual harassment as the result of a "per-
sonal proclivity" of the harasser 228 and concluded that, absent ex-
223. See, e.g., Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980)
(corporation automatically vicariously liable for tort committed by individual who
owned more than 80% of its stock, was a director, and held the three top executive
positions). Judge Butzner, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Friend v.
Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 69 (4th Cir. 1978), opined that an employer should be liable
for racial harassment by its middle-level employees. But see Ginsburg & Koreski,
Sexual Advances by an Employee's Supervisor: A Sex-Discrimination Violation of
Title VII?, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 83, 92 (1977) (whether a supervisor stands high
enough on corporate ladder to be considered the "employer" should be decided on a
case-by-case basis). See also Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 8395, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (corporate employer
not liable when it had a strictly enforced unwritten policy against sexual harassment
and did not know of vice-president's acts of telling plaintiff vulgar jokes, putting his
hand on her shoulders, and showing her photographs of sexual activity, while he ex-
plained her job duties).
224. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
225. Id
226. The EEOC has held that ethnic and racial slurs made toward employees by super-
visors, as well as by employers, violate Title VII. 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 84.10, at 17-1 (rev. ed. 1980) (citing EEOC Decision Nos. 72-0779 (4
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 317 (1971)) & 71-909 (3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 269 (1970)); 4 id §
95.10 (citing EEOC Decision YAL-078 (1969) (unreported)).
227. E.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 69 (4th Cir. 1978) (Butzner, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Foundation, 578 F.2d 95, 98 (5th
Cir. 1978) (dicta); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir.
1977).
228. E.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated &
remanded mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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plicit employer approval or ratification, an employer was not
responsible for sexual harassment by a supervisor.229 Because that
rule would enable an employer to circumvent Title VII by merely
announcing that it prohibits all illegal discrimination, but then
giving its supervisors a free rein, it has been rejected by the courts
in more recent decisions.230
Several courts have concluded that an employer becomes
liable for a supervisor's sexually harassing acts at the point when
it has knowledge of the harassment and has failed to take
prompt,231 appropriate corrective action.232 These cases suggest
that an employer must investigate allegations of harassment
233
229. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976)
("floodgates" will open if sexual harassment claims are recognized, so that we will
need 4,000 federal judges rather than 400), rev'd & remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (no em-
ployer liability for supervisor's "unauthorized isolated sex-related acts"), rev 'd, 600
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (D.
Ariz. 1975) ("The only sure way an employer could avoid [Title VII] charges would be
to have employees who were asexual."), vacated & remanded mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th
Cir. 1977). But see Sexual Harassment & Title VII, supra note 115, at 1025-27 (criti-
cizing Come and other cases for holding employer not liable unless supervisor acting
within scope of employment).
230. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 562 F.2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977). Although Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480
(E.D. Wis. 1979), which adopted the earlier approach, has not been overruled, it has
been undermined to the extent that it relied on the district court cases subsequently
overruled by circuit courts. See note 229 supra.
231. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d Cir. 1977).
232. Id at 1048-49 (Title VII violated when employer does not take prompt and appropri-
ate remedial action after actual or constructive knowledge of supervisor's sexual ex-
tortion); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating, though, that
employers are generally liable under Title VII for supervisors' acts); Vinson v.
Taylor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 30,708, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C. 1980) (em-
ployer not liable when unaware of harassment); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451
F. Supp. 1383, 1389-90 (D. Colo. 1978) (employer liable when made aware but failed to
take adequate corrective measures); Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 382-83
(E.D. Va. 1977) (employer "liable for acts of supervisors only where the employer
either overtly or covertly, authorized, acquiesced in, or ratified the supervisors' dis-
criminatory conduct"), affd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); cf. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437
F. Supp. 1138, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (unavoidable inference that "management" was
or should have been aware of several years' racial harassment of black female by sev-
eral supervisors), aff'd, 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 32,160 (3d
Cir. Sept. 30, 1981).
233. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 804-05 (1st Cir. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389-90 (D. Colo. 1978) (merely calling in the "accused" and
accepting his denial is insufficient).
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and, if they are found to have substance, punish the offending
supervisor.3 4 Some would also impose an affirmative duty to an-
nounce a policy against harassment.2 3 Under this approach, an
employer who takes appropriate remedial action when it learns
that harassment has occurred will not have violated Title VII, par-
ticularly if it had previously announced that its employees were
not to engage in sexual harassment.
23 6
Some courts, however, have applied a strict liability approach
with regard to supervisors' sexual harassment of employees under
their supervision.23 7 For example, in 1979 the Ninth Circuit held in
Miller v. Bank of America238 that an employer is liable, under a
respondeat superior theory, for the harassing acts of its super-
234. Cf Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976). In Bel, when the
plaintiff first complained of co-workers' harassment because she was married to a
black, but she refused to name the co-workers, the employer called in a community
minister to help, reminded all employees of the rules against harassment, and
transferred the plaintiff to another shift. Id at 1128-29. When the plaintiff, after
abandoning a grievance proceeding, complained again and named two co-workers,
those individuals denied that they had harassed her. Id at 1129. The personnel
manager reminded them of the rules and had them sign statements. Id He did not
discipline them because discipline without evidence of misbehavior would violate the
union agreement. Id at 1129-30, 1137. He also posted the rules against harassment
and again called the minister. Id at 1130. The defendants were held to have
"responded swiftly and reasonably to plaintiff's claims." Id at 1137.
235. Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (would re-
quire employer to "inform employees that management is receptive to such com-
plaints and, if proved true, that management will rectify the situation"); Munford v.
James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); cf DeGrace v.
Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 (1st Cir. 1980) (harassment by nonsupervisory per-
sonnel).
236. Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8395, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Price v. John F. Lawhon Furniture Co., 16
Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8342 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (no Title VII violation when employer had
strict policy against sexual fraternization among its employees and plaintiff had
never complained to employer). Judge MacKinnon, concurring in Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1977), would hold that an employer is not liable if it
posts a policy against harassment and provides a workable mechanism for victims to
make prompt complaints so that the employer can rapidly warn the alleged harasser
against harassment.
237. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Ostapowicz v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973), modified on other grounds, 541
F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041, rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 911
(1977); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-87 (W.D. Pa.
1973). In Williams v. Saxbe, Judge Richey seemed to adopt a strict liability position
in stating, "if this was a policy or practice of plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the
agency policy or practice." But it would be wrong to read Williams so broadly,
because the employer there probably had at least constructive knowledge of the
supervisor's behavior, since the plaintiff alleged "that the supervisor's conduct was a
policy or practice imposed on the plaintiff and other women similarly situated." 413
F. Supp. 654, 660 & n.8 (D.D.C. 1976). The majority of the court of appeals in Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977), stated that employers are generally
liable for their supervisors' acts, but that an employer could rebut liability by show-
ing that once it knew of the acts, it corrected the problem. Judge MacKinnon, concur-
ring, argued that the employer's responsibility should not go beyond the normal com-
mon law rules of vicarious liability. Id at 999-1000.
238. 660 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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visory personnel who are "authorized to hire, fire, discipline, or
promote [employees], or at least to participate in or recommend
such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to have
done violates company policy." 23 9 The court in Miller held that the
employee need not first exhaust internal grievance procedures 240
and made clear that the employer is liable for a supervisor's sexual
harassment even if the employer has no knowledge of the miscon-
duct and therefore has had no opportunity to correct the
problem.
241
By adopting the Miller approach in its guidelines, the EEOC
rejects those cases that would not hold an employer in violation of
Title VII unless it had knowledge of sexual harassment com-
mitted by a supervisor. 24 2 In neither Bundy v. Jackson2 43 nor
Brown v. City of Guthrie244 was the court faced with the question
of whether to follow the guidelines' provisions. Both cases in-
volved employers who had knowledge of the supervisor's harass-
ment and had an opportunity to correct the situation but failed to
do so. 245 Because .the guidelines' approach is consistent with non-
harassment cases, 4 6 however, it is likely that courts will follow it.
Even so, a lawyer attempting to resolve a sexual harassment com-
plaint in an efficient manner should make sure, before he or she
sends a client to the EEOC, that the employer (or at least a
superior of the harassing supervisor or agent) has knowledge of
the problem and has failed to correct it.2' 7 This will allow the
employer an opportunity to correct the problem early, and, if he
239. Id. at 213.
240. Id. at 213-14.
241. Id.
242. See notes 231-32 and accompanying text supra. Interestingly, the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs' proposed regulation prohibiting sexual harassment
would require that the government contractor have actual or constructive notice
before it is responsible for the harassment. 44 Fed. Reg. 77,017 (1979) (if adopted, to
be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.8). See generally Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment &
Employer Liability: The Flirtation that Could Cost a Fortune, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
277, 280-81 (1980).
243. 24 EmpL Prac. Dec. 31,439 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on remand, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec.
31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1981).
244. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
245. Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,530-31 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12,
1981); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627, 1631 (W.D. Okla.
1980).
246. See note 227 and accompanying text supra.
247. This is especially true given the fact that various self-help measures by harassment
victims appear to have great success. For example, 70% of the female and 29% of the
male respondents to a federal survey reported that their request of an investigation
by their own organization "made things better"; 54% of the females and 67% of the
males reported improvement resulting from asking or telling the harasser to stop.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 12-13. The
respective reports of improvement upon reporting harassment to the supervisor or
other officials were 53% and 35%. Id. at 12.
1981]
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fails to do so, will present a stronger case for the employee should
the claim reach the courts.
2. Employer's Liability for Acts of Co-Workers
Subsection (d) of the guidelines. provides that an employer
may also be liable for sexual harassment by employees other than
supervisors or agents: "With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer, its agents or super-
visory employees, knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action. 248 Because the EEOC admits that such employees are
not acting as agents of the employer, and Title VII holds an
employer responsible only for its own acts and those of its
agents,249 the EEOC must view such employees' conduct as con-
duct of the employer itself.
248. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)). The guideline,
however, makes no provision for an employer who is bound by a union contract to
have more evidence before disciplining an employee than the EEOC would require to
prove a violation. See note 234 supra (discussion of Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976)). Quaere whether the EEOC would then find that the
union was also in violation of Title VII. See generally Note, Job-Related Sexual
Harassment & Union Women- What are Their Rights?, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
929 (1980); see also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 49-50.
The only difference between the cases and the guideline is that the cases require
swift or prompt action, whereas the guideline requires, arguably more restrictively,
immediate action. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Gas & Elec. Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049
(3d Cir. 1977) (employer must take "prompt" action to rectify harassment by super-
visor); Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (employer
properly acted "swiftly"); Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241,
250-51 (Minn. 1980) (employer's "failure to respond promptly to [plaintiff's] com-
plaints regarding the grabbing incident 'connected' [the employer] to the act of sex-
ual harassment perpetrated by its employee" and thus violated Minnesota Human
Rights Act); cf. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer can
rebut liability for supervisor's harassment if "consequences are rectified when
discovered"). "Prompt" has been defined as "to act immediately, responding on the
instant" and as "ready and quick to act as occasion demands. The meaning of the
word depends largely on the facts of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). For example, the court in a copyright case held that a deposit of two
copies of the best edition of a work, made 27 years after its publication, met the
statutory requirement of a "prompt" deposit. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 409 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1946). "Immediate" is defined as
"[piresent, at once; without delay; not deferred by any interval of time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 884 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In this sense, the word denotes that action is or
must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time. On the other
hand, "immediate" has also been construed as "[a] reasonable time in view of par-
ticular facts and circumstances of case under consideration." Id. This construction
would be the most appropriate for the sexual harassment guideline.
249. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(b), 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b),
2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
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Both prior judicial2 50 and EEOC decisions 251 unanimously
agree that the employer is responsible for harassment by a mere
250. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 804-05 (1st Cir. 1980) (remanding case to see if
employer had taken sufficient steps to cure the problem, when external investigation
had been dropped at black plaintiff's request, but employer could have conducted in-
ternal investigation concerning threatening notes); Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138,
140-42 (9th Cir. 1978) (derogatory characterization by plaintiff's co-workers, of plain-
tiff's black trainee as a "jungle bunny," was "not the sort of conduct which Title VII
was enacted to prohibit" and in any event the employer could not be held liable, in the
absence of knowledge, for even continuing racial harassment); Higgins v. Gates Rub-
ber Co., 578 F.2d 281, 283 (10th Cir. 1978) (no liability for firing black plaintiff for hit-
ting co-worker harasser over the head with a wrench, because no finding that
employer was aware of racial harassment); Kidd v. American Air Filter Co., 23 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 31,126, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (employer not liable
where it made appropriate attempt to protect German plaintiff from co-workers'
alleged harassment because of her national origin); St. J. Enriquez v. Transit Mixed
Concrete Co., 492 F. Supp. 390 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (employer not liable for co-workers'
harassment of plaintiff because of his national origin, where he did not notify his
supervisors); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35 (W.D.N.Y.
1978) (police department "failed either to conduct a full investigation or to take ac-
tion upon completion of the investigation" of racial harassment by co-workers);
Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 376, 383-84 (E.D. Va. 1977) (employer had
done what it could to prevent white co-workers' racial harassment and had ade-
quately punished several harassers by reducing their pay; unless the employees com-
plain, the employer cannot be held liable for co-workers' racist comments), affd, 588
F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (N.D. Ohio
1976) (no illegal race discrimination found where employer had investigated and tried
to prevent recurrence of co-workers' acts); Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388
F. Supp. 603, 604-05, 607 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (employer not liable for co-workers'
harassment of black plaintiff, where employer disciplined one who used a racist term
and because of plaintiff's complaint conducted an investigation, which it terminated
when co-workers denied the harassment, and employer warned employees that
harassment would be disciplined); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp.
1177, 1186-87 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (employer not liable for co-workers' harassment of
Hungarian plaintiff in violation of employer's policy when employer was not always
aware of harassment but when informed took steps to stop it; in any event, the
harassment was not motivated by plaintiff's national origin); see Younger v.
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 756 (W.D. Va. 1976) (no Title VII
violation where one of over 450 employees, a white, on several occasions made dis-
paraging references to a black co-worker); Walker v. Columbia Univ., 407 F. Supp.
1370, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("residuary male chauvinism on the part of individual
employees... does not make a pattern or practice chargeable to an employer"); cf
Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (knowl-
edge of employer's subordinates of racial animosity between plaintiff and co-workers
sufficient); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp., 479 F. Supp. 452 (D. Colo. 1979) (employer
liable for racial harassment of non-blacks by co-workers when department director
failed to take corrective action); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894
(D.N.J. 1979) (liability found where supervisors knew of and condoned co-workers'
sexual harassment); Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn.
1980) (under state fair employment practices law, although an employer has no duty
to provide a "pristine working environment," it does have a "duty to take prompt
and appropriate action" when it knows or should know that "repeated and unwel-
come sexually derogatory remarks and sexually motivated physical conduct are
directed at an employee because she is female"; employer failed to take sufficient cor-
rective action after plaintiff complained of co-workers' sexually derogatory remarks,
touching her between the legs and on her posterior, breaking her car's headlights, and
threatening her with a gun). A post-guideline decision is in accord. EEOC v. Olin
Corp., 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (26 EmpL Prac. Dec.) 32,164, at 22,032
(W.D.N.C. 1980). But see Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah
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co-worker only if the employer has been made actually or con-
structively aware of the problem and has failed to take prompt,
appropriate action. Arguably, the inaction of the employer, his or
her failure to take reasonable remedial steps, acts as ratification of
the harassment. 252 The position of the courts is exemplified by the
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in a racial harassment case:
It may not always be within an employer's power to guar-
antee an environment free from all bigotry. He cannot
change the personal beliefs of his employees; he can let it
be known, however, that racial harassment will not be
tolerated, and he can take all reasonable measures to en-
force this policy .... But once an employer has in good
faith taken those measures which are both feasible and
reasonable under the circumstances to combat the offen-
sive conduct we do not think he can be charged with dis-
criminating on the basis of race.
253
The courts also have followed this approach in sexual harassment
cases. 254
3. Employer's Liability for Acts of Non-Employees
The EEOC guidelines provide the same standard of liability
for acts of non-employees as they do for acts of co-workers: "An
1971) (progress under Title VII will be "slowed, if not stopped," if employer "is able
to hide behind the shield of the individual employee action").
No court has held an employer strictly liable for harassment by a co-worker who
is not in a position to affect the employment advancement of the victim. See Smith v.
Rust Eng'r Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8698, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1172 (N.D. Ala.
1978) (no Title VII violation where male co-worker who made the advances had the
same job classification as plaintiff and did not promise her any employment-related
benefits). One case carried this position to its illogical extreme by holding that there
could be no violation of Title VII where the plaintiff refused her male co-worker's ad-
vances, and he subsequently became promoted and, in retaliation, refused to reap-
point her to her job. The court found the lack of employment ramifications at the time
of the original advances decisive. Cordes v. County of Yavapai, 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1224 (D. Ariz. 1978).
251. EEOC Decision No. 74-05, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6387 (1973) (employer liable
for constructive discharge of Spanish-surnamed plaintiff who quit because of "kid-
ding" by black co-workers, when employer had failed to take adequate remedial
steps); 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 84.10, at 17-2 & n.6 (rev. ed.
1980) (ethnic jokes and insults).
252. See W. SEAVEY, AGENCY § 37 (1964); cf. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 229 (1952) (ratifica-
tion by principal of unauthorized contract by an agent).
253. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 (1st Cir. 1980).
254. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894,935-42 (D.N.J. 1978) (finding
Title VII liability where supervisors not only failed to take steps to correct but con-
doned sexual harassment); Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.
1980) (employer liable under state fair employment practices law for failing to take
appropriate corrective measures against sexual harassment).
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employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees,
with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,
where the employer, its agents or supervisory employees, knows
or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate
and appropriate corrective action.' '255 On its face, this guideline
makes the novel suggestion that an employer can be found to have
violated Title VII, not because of something the employer or its
employees have done, but because the employer has failed to cor-
rect the acts of non-agent business invitees such as independent
contractors, sales and repair persons, customers, clients, or pa-
tients, as well as non-invitees such as trespassers. In the supple-
mentary information accompanying the final guidelines, the
EEOC states that an employer's liability "for acts of non-
employees towards employees.., will be determined on a case-by-
case basis, taking all facts into consideration. '256 The guideline
also provides that "[i]n reviewing these cases the Commission will
consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the
conduct of such non-employees. ' ' 257 The phrase "any other legal
responsibility" only obfuscates what at first would seem to be an
indication that the employer would be responsible only for the
acts of those persons over which he or she has clear control.
25
8
This subsection appears to have been at least partially in-
spired by the recent case of EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 29 decided
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. In denying the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment against the EEOC and an intervening individual plaintiff,
Judge Ward held that a woman who alleged that she was sexually
harassed by customers, because her employer required her to wear
a tight-fitting, revealing uniform, stated a cause of action under
Title VII.2 60 The plaintiff's job required her to serve as combina-
tion receptionist, maintenance worker, and bouncer in the elevator
lobby of an office building. 261 At a trial on the merits, the plaintiff
255. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)); see text accom-
panying note 248 supra.
256. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
257. Id. at 74,677 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
258. For example, a school would have more control over the in-school behavior of its
students toward teachers than would a circus over the actions of parade-watchers
toward circus employees marching through city streets. Cf W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971) (vicarious liability); W. SEAVEY, AGENCY §§
3E, 84C, 86 (1964) (importance of right to control in determination of masters' and
principals' liability for acts of servants and agents).
259. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
260. 23 EmpL Prac. Dec. 31,046 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
261. 507 F. Supp. 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Not only were there no similarly situated
males, but no male employees had been required to wear revealing uniforms. Id at
604. As the court stated: "[Blut for her womanhood [plaintiff] would not have been
required to [wear]... a uniform that subjected her to sexual harassment." Id at 608.
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proved that when she wore the uniform in question, an octagonal,
red, white, and blue Bicentennial poncho with side slits that
revealed her thighs and part of her buttocks, 62 male passers-by
propositioned her and made sexual puns.263 The plaintiff was so
humiliated that she was "unable to perform her duties
properly." 264 When she complained to the employer and refused to
continue to wear the uniform, she was fired.265 The court, holding
that the employer had violated Title VII, found the employer
liable for sexual harassment by its business invitees because the
employer took no action after it had knowledge of the harassment,
and because the harassment was prompted by the employer's
requiring the plaintiff to wear the sexy outfit. The action the court
asked of the employer was to provide the claimant a non-revealing
uniform.
266
One post-guideline EEOC decision involved facts similar to
those in Sage Realty. A female clerical employee's male supervisor
required her to wear a revealing costume while she acted as a
hostess to visiting VIPs.26 7 When she wore the costume, she was
embarrassed and verbally abused by male visitors.2 68 The super-
visor also retaliated against the woman for rejecting his sexual ad-
vances. 26 9 Although finding the employer liable for the visitors'
harassment would have been consistent with the guidelines and
with Sage Realty, the EEOC focused only on the supervisor's acts
and found the employer strictly liable for them.
270
The guideline concerning employer liability for the conduct of
non-employees does not expressly restrict the employer's liability
262. Id at 604.
263. Id at 605 & n.11. One passer-by told the plaintiff that he would "run it up the flag
pole any time [she] want[ed] to." Id.
264. Id at 605, 606 n.12. The court distinguished those cases in which an employer
imposes "reasonable grooming and dress requirements on its employees, where those
requirements have a negligible effect on employment opportunities and present no
distinct employment disadvantages." Id. at 608. See note 179 and accompanying
text supra.
265. 507 F. Supp. 599, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
266. Id at 607-08. The guideline does not appear to give special consideration to those
situations in which the employee is an entertainer who has agreed to wear a sexy out-
fit that is considered necessary in order to perform the job, arguably raising a BFOQ
question. See note 38 supra. See also 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
15.10 (rev. ed. 1980); MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 209. Similarly, the guideline seems
to require that a burlesque hall owner take "appropriate corrective action" when a
customer makes an unwelcome sexual comment to an exotic dancer. Yet the different
concerns in those situations were hinted at during closing argument in Sage Realty,
when the judge told defense counsel that if her client had asked the plaintiff "to per-
form in a pageant on a stage, I could have no quarrel with his doing that. But he took
people who were employed not in a theatre where you expect to show yourself ....
507 F. Supp. 599, 610 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
267. EEOC Decision No. 81-17, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 1 6757, at 4799 (Feb. 6, 1981).





EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines
to cases where the harassment is brought about by the employer's
act. Yet, in order to make an employer answerable for the acts of
non-agents, the facts must support a finding that the employer
ratified the harassment."71 The EEOC's theory seems to be that
failure to take appropriate action 72 amounts to ratification. For
example, it might be reasonable to require an employer to wash off
or paint over racist or sexual graffiti27 3 scrawled by a business in-
vitee or a trespassing vandal. Yet one must wonder what action is
appropriate when a customer makes a crude comment to an
employee and what inaction is sufficient to ratify the harassment.
Certainly an employer who requires an employee to accept sexual
assaults or harassment by a customer as a condition of employ-
ment would violate Title VII.2 7' These are the circumstances of
Sage Realty. Aside from this situation, it is difficult to predict
what action or inaction by an employer would render it liable
under the guidelines for the acts of non-employees. Perhaps the
EEOC requires that the employer play a paternalistic role in pro-
tecting its employees from the sexual behavior of others.
In response to questions of what action would be appropriate
under the interim guidelines' substantively identical provisions
concerning harassment by non-employees and by co-workers, the
EEOC merely stated, "What is considered to be 'appropriate' will
be seen in the context of specific cases through Commission deci-
sions. 27 As a result of the vagueness of the guideline, employers
must watch for the EEOC's case-by-case interpretations. Ex-
chairperson Eleanor Holmes Norton has said that the EEOC per-
sonnel are "acutely aware of the need to apply the rules of com-
mon sense and fairness. "276
The EEOC guideline seems to go beyond Sage Realty by mak-
ing a blanket extension of the employer's responsibility, absent its
taking "immediate and appropriate corrective action," to include
responsibility for sexual harassment by non-agent customers and
other non-employees. That reading should be rejected. While the
eradication of all sexual harassment is a desirable end, Congress,
271. See notes 250-52 and accompanying text supra.
272. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
273. See Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(employer painted over insulting graffiti); Rattner v. Trans World Airlines, No.
4135-J (N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights Sept. 11, 1973) (unlawful to require
Jewish employee to work where supervisor knew employee would be exposed to anti-
Semitic graffiti).
274. See MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 34-35 (when a waitress complained to her boss that
a customer had put his hand up her skirt, the waitress was punished for her non-
compliance).
275. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).




in Title VII, prohibited only discriminatory acts by employers and
their agents.277 Requiring the employer to be responsible for the
acts of its non-employees, where the employer does not cause, en-
courage, or promote the harassment, is without a basis in the
statute.
4. Preventive Measures to Combat Harassment
Although the EEOC does not reward an employer who takes
preventive measures against sexual harassment, by easing its
standard of holding employers strictly liable for acts of super-
visory employees and agents, the EEOC exhorts employers to
take such measures. The guideline provides that
[ain employer should take all steps necessary to prevent
sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively
raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, devel-
oping the appropriate sanctions, informing employees of
their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harass-
ment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensi-
tize all concerned.278
The EEOC has, by other action, specifically directed federal agen-
cies to take preventive measures against sexual harassment.
27 9
Because the guideline asserts that the employer should take
preventive steps, rather than shall take these steps, the guideline
may be understood to mean that employers ought to rather than
must take preventive measures. 280 This understanding is sup-
ported by the following supplementary information accompany-
ing the identical provision in the interim guidelines, which speaks
of voluntary action:
Consistent with the policy of voluntary compliance under
Title VII, § 1604.11(e) recognizes that the best way to
277. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(b), 703(a)(I)-(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b),
2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
278. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
279. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 19-20,
E-11-E-13. Most of the agencies have taken such steps. Id at F-1-F-6.
280. "Should" is defined as
the past tense of shall, ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although
usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral
obligation, thereby distinguishing it from "ought".... It is not normally
synonymous with "may"; and although often interchangeable with the word
"would," it does not ordinarily express certainty as "will" sometimes does.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted). The under-
standing that the word "should" means something less than "shall" is illustrated by
the protest of the chairman of the American Bar Association Special Committee on
Public Interest Practice of the substitution of "should" for "shall" in the proposed
ethics rule concerning pro bono representation: "We believe that substituting
'should' for 'shall' would understandably weaken.., what was intended as a state-
ment of obligation to a mere wish, with little or no practical significance." 67
A.B.A.J. 536 (1981).
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achieve an environment free of sexual harassment is to
prevent the occurrence of sexual harassment by utilizing
appropriate methods to alert the employees to the prob-
lem and to stress that sexual harassment, in any form,
will not be tolerated.
281
Yet, as those comments continue, they seem to indicate an intent
to make mandatory the taking of some type of preventive meas-
ures: "This paragraph (e) of § 1604.11 requires an employer to take
all steps necessary for the prevention of sexual harassment and
gives . . . examples of steps which might be deemed
necessary.. .. 2 82 The language of the supplementary information
accompanying the final guideline on employers' preventive action
also indicates that such action may be considered mandatory:
Section 1604.11(e) of the Interim Guidelines, which sets
out suggestions for programs to be developed by
employers to prevent sexual harassment, now becomes
§ 1604.11(f). The Commission has received many com-
ments which state that this section is not specific enough.
The Commission has decided that the provisions of this
section should illustrate several kinds of action which
might be appropriate, depending on the employer's cir-
cumstances. The emphasis is on preventing sexual har-
assment, and § 1604.11(f) intends only to offer illustrative
suggestions with respect to possible components of a pre-
vention program. Since each workplace requires its own
individualized program to prevent sexual harassment, the
specific steps to be included in the program should be de-
veloped by each employer.
283
If the EEOC intends to mandate preventive acts, it must then
consider an employer's failure to take preventive measures
against sexual harassment per se violative of the guidelines and
Title VII, even if no such harassment actually occurred. Because a
finding of a violation of section 703 in the absence of any discrimi-
nation whatsoever would be inconsistent with the statutory lan-
guage, 284 that cannot be a fair reading of the guideline. Nonethe-
less, even if the EEOC does not purport to require employers to
take steps to prevent sexual harassment, the stringency of the
guideline encourages employers to minimize sexual harassment of
281. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
282. 1& (emphasis added); see 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.64, at
8-109 (rev. ed. 1980) (terming the interim EEOC guidelines "somewhat schizophrenic
on the topic of preventive measures" in imposing "a detailed and emphatic list of
obligations on the employer" without providing "any assurance that such solicitude
will purchase immunity from attack").
283. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (emphasis added). For more specific suggestions, see SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 102-04, H-7.
284. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
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their employees in any way possible. Many employers have al-
ready responded to the guideline by introducing preventive meas-
ures against sexual harassment.18
V. ALTERNATIVES TO TITLE VII RELIEF
Victims of sexual or non-sexual harassment who are not pro-
tected by Title VII have numerous legal alternatives that they
can pursue to obtain relief. This article cannot address all of these
alternatives, which include criminal actions,2 6 suits under the
285. Lublin, Resisting Advances: Employers Act to Curb Sex Harassing on Job; Lawsuits,
Fines Feared, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 1, col 1. Also, the courts may use the
guidelines' section on preventive measures as a framework for injunctions, outlining
what steps employers who have been found guilty of discrimination must take. The
court of appeals in Bundy did so. Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,439
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981), on reman4 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,710 (D.D.C. Mar. 23,
1981); see Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Employment Context" An Analysis of
the New Title VII Cause of Action, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 611-14 (1980).
286. The possibilities of criminal sanctions against the harasser, which are intended to
provide a remedy for the general public rather than for the individual victim, and of
the availability of government funds for crime victims are beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of these issues, see, for example, Gates v. State, 110 Ga.
App. 303, 138 S.E.2d 473 (1964) (a man's intentional, unexcused touching of a woman
on the buttocks constitutes criminal battery); Note, Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATEU. L. REV. 879,
886-99 (1980); Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 762 (1980) (gestures as punishable obscenity). See
also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 159, 161-64. Of course, Gates poses equal protec-
tion problems unless criminal sanctions would be equally applicable to a similar
touching by a woman. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based
state action violates equal protection clause unless sex-based classification is
substantially related to achievement of important governmental objectives).
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federal post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts,2 87 actions under state88
and local2s9 fair employment practices laws, and, in situations in
which the harasser acts on behalf of the government, suits under
state290 and federal 291 constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal
287. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1976). Section 1981 applies to private employers who dis-
criminate on the basis of race, but not on the basis of sex. E.g., O'Connell v. Teachers
College, 63 F.R.D. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). It has been used in cases of racial harass-
ment by an employer. Croker v. Boeing Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1783 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (awarding $1000 punitive damages).
Sections 1985 and 1986, concerning conspiracy to deprive one of federal rights
and neglecting to stop such a conspiracy, cover sex discrimination by private
employers. E.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894,949-50 (D.N.J. 1978).
But see Great American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (con-
spiracy merely to deprive one of rights guaranteed by Title VII is not actionable
under § 1985).
Section 1983 also applies to sex discrimination, but only with regard to state
action. Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977). It has been held
applicable to sexual harassment. Woerner v. Brzeczek, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 897
(N.D. Ill. Jul. 21, 1981). Because of sovereign immunity, a state or municipal
employer is not liable for its employees' discriminatory acts unless these acts are
shown to be the custom or policy of the employer; respondeat superior is inapplicable.
Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). Action against the
employer under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act's prohibition of sys-
tematic threats to worker goals, integrity, or well-being has been suggested. MAcKIN-
NON, supra note 1, at 159; see 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
288. For the most part, state fair employment practices laws follow Title VII. E.g., MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-17 (1979). The Maryland Commission on Human Relations
has held that an employer's failure to take action when it received a complaint of sex-
ual harassment of a barmaid by a cook violates the state fair employment practices
law. Boyd v. Kattavia P.S. Inc., No. E77-141 (Md. Comm'n on Human Relations Jan.
9, 1980). In another case, a Baltimore City court granted an injunction against
transferring an employee until the Commission held a hearing on her charge that the
proposed transfer was in retaliation for her having complained that "her supervisor
had repeatedly touched her in a sexual manner." James, Court Extends Bar to Job
Shift in Harassment Case, The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Feb. 18, 1981, at D12, col. 1.
The Maryland Commission received 170 complaints of sexual harassment in 1980. Id
Maryland Governor Hughes has issued an executive order prohibiting sexual
harassment, as defined in the EEOC's interim guidelines, within Maryland's ex-
ecutive branch. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1980.16 (Oct. 20, 1980). The governor of Rhode
Island has issued Executive Order No. 80-9, prohibiting sexual harassment of state
employees. 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 27,680 (1980). The governor of South
Dakota has signed Executive Order 81-08 to the same effect. 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 1 27,955 (1981). The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission has
promulgated very detailed regulations prohibiting harassment because of sex.
Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment & Employer Liability: The Flirtation that Could Cost
a Fortune, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 277, 281-82 (1980). Colorado and Pennsylvania have
adopted the EEOC final guidelines on sexual harassment. 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 21,065.11 & 27,280 (1980). Michigan, which adopted the EEOC interim
guidelines on sexual harassment, recently amended its state law to cover all
employers, even those having only one employee. Id. 124,200.04.
289. E.g., BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4, § 10 (1976).
290. E.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 (due process). The Maryland due process
clause has been construed to include an equal protection guarantee. Board of Super-
visors v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 396 A.2d 1033 (1979).
291. The fourteenth amendment pertains to state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Sex discrimination suits may be brought against federal defendants not covered by
Title VII, such as members of Congress, under the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment's due process clause. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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protection of the law and under state equal rights amendments. 292
A brief discussion of common law tort and contract actions, how-
ever, may be illuminating.
Various tort theories may be applicable to harassment:
assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligence, slander, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with con-
tract. Harassment victims have already sought and obtained
relief under most of these theories. One who is wrongfully touched
may sue for battery;29 3 one reasonably 94 put in fear of offensive
touching may sue for assault.2 95 In one incident in Maryland, a
supervisor chained a black worker to a bench while commenting,
"Your people look natural that way. 2 96 That racial harassment
would also constitute false imprisonment 297 - a tort which might
easily be committed in a sexual harassment situation if, for exam-
ple, a woman's co-worker locked her in a closet in order to kiss
her.298 If the tort occurred on the job, the woman might have a
292. E.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46.
293. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 36 n.85 (4th ed. 1971); Com-
ment, Title VII: LegalProtection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REV. 123,
136 n.62 (1977); Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to
Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 893, 898-99 (1980); Note, Legal
Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 151,
168-69 (1979). See also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 165, 167.
294. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 39 (4th ed. 1971) (the apprehen-
sion of a battery, which constitutes an element of assault, must be "one which would
normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person").
295. See Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980) (deny-
ing corporate employer's motions for judgment n.o.v., new trial, and remittitur of
jury verdict of $52,500 against corporate employer of individual who touched plain-
tiff and made sexual advances toward her, in an action for assault); Skousen v. Nidy,
90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1962) (affirming $5000 verdict for 65 year-old female
employee against male employer for assault by placing his hands upon her private
parts and attempting to seduce her by force); cf. Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 4
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 1 32,138 (D.N.J. June 17, 1981) (pen-
dent jurisdiction in Title VII sexual harassment suit of plaintiffs' claims of assault and
battery, negligence, gross negligence, and intentional interference with contractual
relations; plaintiffs alleged harassment by their "work product being stolen or other-
wise ruined" and that they were endangered by the placing of hazardous chemicals
above their desks and in their work areas). See generally MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
165-67; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 38 & n.9, 39 & n.12, 40
& n.20 (4th ed. 1971); see also Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practi-
tioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 893, 899-902 (1980);
Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 151, 169, 170-71 & n.100 (1979); Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 708 (1981).
296. Robinson, Baltimore County Settles Racism Suit, The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 3, 1980,
at E8, col. 1.
297. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (4th ed. 1981).
298. See Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1979)
(plaintiff alleged assault, battery, false imprisonment, and rape by agents and
officers of her employer; court reversed granting of demurrer).
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cause of action against her employer under the principle of
respondeat superior, 299 as well as against the individual tortfeasor.
Similarly, if an employee is criminally sexually assaulted on the
job, he or she might have a cause of action against his or her
employer for negligence for failure to take adequate precautions
against the crime. 300 Some types of sexual statements made con-
cerning an employee may be defamatory.30' For example, such lies
as those told by Dolly Parton's boss in the cinematic comedy, "9
to 5," who bragged that he and she were having an extramarital
affair, would be actionable as slander. In order to recover for
harassment under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 302 a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct
was "intentional or reckless" and "extreme and outrageous" and
that it caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 0 3 The tort
seems tailor-made for the case of an employer or supervisor who
hounds an employee with the intention of substantially interfer-
ing with his or her work or of intimidating or offending him or
her 30 4 because, where the defendant is "in a peculiar position to
299. See Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980) (jury
found corporate employer liable for assault by its agent on its employee); Siniscalco,
Sexual Harassment & Employer Liability: The Flirtation that Could Costa Fortune, 6
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 277, 288 (1980); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related
Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 151, 174-75 (1979). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 464-66 (4th ed. 1971). If the tortfeasor who
commits an intentional tort "acts from purely personal motives .... in the ordinary
case .... the master is not liable." Id at 465. Some courts, however, have held the
employer liable "where the servant, for strictly personal reasons ..., attacks the
plaintiff in a quarrel which arises out of the employment." Id at 465-66. But see
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring);
Seymour, Sexual Harassment: Finding a Cause of Action under Title VII, 30 LAB.
L.J. 139, 141 & n.4 (1979).
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314(B), 448 (1965); cf Clark v. World Air-
ways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980) (jury found for corporate
employer with regard to charge of negligent supervision of harasser, but against it
for assault); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 167, 359 A.2d 548, 553 (1976) (landlord
may be liable in negligence for injury caused to tenant by third party criminal).
301. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 30; Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 892 n.70
(1980).
302. Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 151,171-72 & n.107 (1979); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1290, 1318 (1971). See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
303. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977) (suit against employer
and supervisor for emotional distress resulting from supervisor's and co-workers'
ridiculing plaintiff's stutter failed because there was insufficient proof that the
resulting emotional distress was severe); see Robinson, Secretary Sues Employer
over Bathroom Videotaping, The Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 22, 1981, at C20, col. 1
(woman filed suit in Baltimore County Circuit Court alleging "intense and severe
mental arzd emotional suffering and distress" caused by former employer's videotap-
ing her use of the bathroom).
304. See Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (en
banc) (reversing dismissal of suit against employer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress by co-workers' and supervisors' racial jokes and slurs against
Mexican-Americans and for wrongful termination); MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
167-69; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (4th ed. 1971).
334 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 10
harass the plaintiff, and cause emotional distress, his conduct will
be carefully scrutinized. ' 30 5 Where the harassment is not by the
employer or its agent, recovery for tortious interference with an
employee's contract rights is sometimes available.
30 6
If an employer is the harasser, the employee may have a cause
of action for breach of contract. In several cases in which an
employer had hired a woman without a written contract so that
she could be fired at will, but the employer fired her because she
rejected his sexual advances, the woman has recovered under an
implied contract theory.0 7 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has recently recognized a cause of action for abusive dis-
305. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 569, 380 A.2d 611, 614-15 (1977).
306. E.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac.
Dec..) 1 32,138, at 22,220-21 (D.N.J. June 17, 1981) (pendent jurisdiction in Title VII
sexual harassment suit of plaintiffs' claims of intentional interference by co-workers
with contractual relations); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 950
(D.N.J.) (punitive damages awarded for intentional interference with contract),
vacated in part on other grounds, 473 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1978), decision on relief for
individual plaintiff, 476 F. Supp. 335, 340-41 (D.N.J. 1979); see Comment, Title VII:
Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassmen 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 137 n.62 (1977);
Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions,
10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 895-98 (1980). Contra, Clark v. World Airways, Inc.,
24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,385 (D.D.C. 1980) (default judgment for plaintiff for in-
terference with contract set aside because employer cannot tortiously interfere with
its own contract, therefore an agent of the employer cannot tortiously interfere with
plaintiff's contract; nor is theory generally applicable with regard to one who seeks
no commercial advantage from his wrong or with regard to a contract at will).
307. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (3 to 1 decision)
(woman fired in bad faith, when personnel manager knew her foreman's advances had
been repelled by her, had cause of action for breach of contract); MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 74-75 (reporting settlement of a case involving similar claim); Comment,
Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassmen 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 136
n.62 (1977); Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to
Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 151, 175-76 (1979); cf Tybor, Fired
'Whistleblower' Can Seek Damages, Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (Illinois
Supreme Court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981), expanded the tort of "retaliatory discharge"). But see Comerford
v. International Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938) (no breach of contract
not to terminate plaintiff as long as services satisfactory when plaintiff fired because
his wife would not submit to sexual advances made by plaintiff's employer). Closely
related to the implied contract theory is the theory that the employer committed
fraud and deceit when hiring the plaintiff. See Note, Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879,
902-05 (1980).
Union contracts' common provision that an employee not be terminated except
for "just cause" might also provide an avenue of relief. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
159; see SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at H-6, H-7,
H-13. But see id at 69, H-7 (cases in which union not helpful).
19811 EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines
charge of an at-will employee. °0
In view of the non-Title VII alternatives available to harass-
ment victims, 30 9 the EEOC had no compelling need to exceed its
308. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). In an opinion
written by Chief Judge Murphy, the unanimous court stated that an "at will"
employee may sue if his or her dismissal "contravenes some clear mandate of public
policy" expressed either in court decisions or in statutes passed by the General
Assembly. The case involved allegations of firing for having uncovered corruption,
but the language suggests that invidiously discriminatory discharges might also be
actionable. The countervailing argument would be that, under the principle of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, article 49B of the Maryland Annotated Code pro-
vides the only state remedy for sex discrimination because the legislature covered
those acts it intended to cover in article 49B. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16
(1979).
309. For various reasons, the common law theories may not be as attractive to a potential
plaintiff as would a Title VII theory. They do not give, as does Title VII, explicit pro-
tection from retaliatory conduct by his or her employer for having filed the charge.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). Under Title VII, an
employee may receive equitable remedies including an injunction. Id § 706(g), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 55.41 (rev. ed.
1980 & Supp. 1980); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harass-
men4 64 MINN. L. REV. 151, 160-61 (1979). The result of an injunction is often that
more than the individual plaintiff will be protected. Under Title VII, at no out-of-
pocket cost, an employee can put a great deal of pressure on an employer by simply
filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See notes 67-69 and accompanying
text supra. If an employee eventually goes to court and wins, Title VII provides for
recovery of attorneys' fees. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976); see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-22 (1978)
(prevailing plaintiff will ordinarily be awarded attorneys' fees, but prevailing defen-
dants will be awarded attorneys' fees only if plaintiff's action was frivolous). As a
result, lawyers are more likely to accept a Title VII case than a tort case where
monetary damages are slim.
On the other hand, in a common law suit, punitive damages may be recoverable,
whereas they are not under Title VII. E.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808
(1st Cir. 1980); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340-41 (D.N.J. 1979)
(punitive damages awarded for intentional interference with contract); Compston v.
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976); see 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 55.42 (rev. ed. 1980 & Supp. 1980); Comment, Title VII: Legal Pro-
tection Against Sexual Harassment; 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 136 n.62 (1977); Note,
Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassmen 64 MINN. L. REV. 151,
160 (1979). Compensatory damages for physical and emotional problems resulting
from the harassment may also be available in a tort suit. E.g., Kyriazi v. Western
Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 950 (D.N.J. 1978) (compensatory and punitive damages
available for tortious interference with plaintiff's employment contract); see Lublin,
Resisting Advances: Employers Act to Curb Sex Harassing on Job; Lawsuits, Fines
Feared, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 1, col 1 ($140,000 verdict plus interest awarded
against Ford Motor Company and plant foreman for promising woman easier work in
exchange for sexual favors); Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 944 (1975 & Supp. 1980). But cf
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974) (award of
damages for mental suffering in breach of contract action improper). They are not re-
coverable in a Title VII suit. E.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir.
1980); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (but court did
award nominal damages); see 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 55.43
(rev. ed. 1980 & Supp. 1980); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual
Harassmen 64 MINN. L. REV. 151, 160-61 (1979). But cf. Broadway Realty v. New
York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 A.D.2d 422, 376 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975) (plaintiff
awarded $100 for mental anguish and humiliation resulting from defendant's viola-
tion of state fair employment practices law); School Dist. v. Nilsen, 271 Or. 461, 534
P.2d 1135 (1975) (under facts of the case, money damages not warranted for humilia-
tion because of defendant's violation of state fair employment practices law). See gen-
erally Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort
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delegated powers by failing to require, in its sexual harassment
guidelines, a comparison of the treatment of similarly situated
men and women. The Senate Labor Committee 10 and President
Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 1' in their review of the
EEOC guidelines, should redraft the guidelines to make it clear
that the Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination covers all
gender-based - but only gender-based - harassment. Absent
redrafting, the EEOC and the courts should so construe the
guidelines in order to make them consistent with Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's recogni-
tion that sexual harassment is a serious problem is welcome. Its
guidelines on the subject have, with good reason, been termed a
"major step" forward in women's fight for equality in employ-
ment.312 To the extent that the guidelines are a clear, correct inter-
pretation of Title VII they offer new predictability and uniformity
for the law of sexual harassment.
On the other hand, by overlooking the threshold question in
Title VII gender discrimination cases of whether similarly situ-
ated males and females are being or would be treated differently,
the guidelines are both underinclusive and overinclusive. The
Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 888-95 (1980).
An employee can be fired with impunity for filing a tort suit; his or her only
remedy would be damages. Unemployment compensation, however, might be
available. See Ca!dwell v. Hodgeman, 4 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (26 Empl. Prac.
Dec.) 31,932 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 6, 1981) (women who quit their jobs because of
sexual harassment have the right to collect unemployment benefits); Note,
Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Work-Related Sexual
Harassment, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173 (1980). See also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
42-43, 77-81, 260-61 n.108. But see Colduvell v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. Commw. Ct.
185, 408 A.2d 1207 (1979) (unemployment compensation denied where employee held
not to have made a reasonable attempt to stay on the job when she quit without tell-
ing her employer about sexual harassment by office manager; fact that she tried once
but he was too busy to talk to her was insufficient); McCain v. Employment Div., 17
Or. App. 442, 522 P.2d 1208 (1974) (plaintiff unjustified under state unemployment
compensation law in quitting because of poster in male employees' lunchroom por-
traying the "perfect woman" as having only a torso; poster, of woman in a bikini, on
the office wall; and postcard of nude woman on manager's desk).
One possible complication in recovering under a common law theory for a work-
related wrong is a requirement, as in California, that workers' compensation be
shown to be unavailable and therefore not the exclusive remedy., See Note, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 879, 882, 906-21 (1980). But see, e.g., Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l
Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 178, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597, 599 (1979) (workers' compensa-
tion not the exclusive remedy for intentional wrongs).
310. Lublin, Resisting Advances: Employers Act to Curb Sex Harassing on the Job;
Lawsuits, Fines Feared, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
311. The administration has announced that the task force, chaired by Vice-President
Bush, is "considering major changes" in the EEOC sexual harassment guidelines.
Nordlinger, The Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 13, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
312. Sex Harassment on Job: New Rules Issued, 66 A.B.A.J. 703 (1980) (quoting Nancy
Kreiter, Research Director of Women Employed in Chicago).
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ambiguity of the guidelines also gives rise to the possibility that
the EEOC or the courts may apply them improperly and find sex-
ual harassment actionable when it results in either no harm or
only de minimus harm. This becomes particularly worrisome when
coupled with the broad language regarding employers' liability for
acts by non-employees. In order to use the EEOC's limited
resources efficiently,s3 and to ensure that the taxpayers and
employers do not shoulder unnecessary costs, 314 the EEOC and
the courts must apply the guidelines in a manner consistent with
the limitations of Title VII.
As Dr. Pangloss demonstrated to Candide long ago, the world
is far from pure. The EEOC cannot promulgate a perfect world.
Congress has not charged the agency with that mission. The
guidelines should be construed to make actionable only harass-
ment practiced by the employer or its agents on members of one
sex but not of the other, which has significant adverse employ-
ment effects for the victim. Provisions concerning the employer's
liability for acts by non-agent employees and non-employees
should be read narrowly. To the extent that Title VII does not pro-
vide a remedy for sexual harassment, adequate recourse is avail-
able directly against the harasser under common law theories.
313. The projected EEOC budget for fiscal 1982 is $160 million and the projected full-time
staff is 3,790 employees. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
1982, H.R. Doc. No. 97-2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. I-V21 & I-V22.
314. A Business Round Table study by the accounting firm of Arthur Anderson & Co.
found that EEOC regulations resulted in incremental costs of $217 million to 48 large
companies in 1977. Telephone Conversation with Martin Lefkowitz, United States
Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 23, 1981). In the EEOC's estimation, the sexual harass-
ment guidelines will impose "no regulatory burdens or recordkeeping requirements"
and have no "major impact on the economy," so that it was not required to prepare a
regulatory analysis. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980). But national productivity would be
unnecessarily lessened to the extent of the tax dollars and the employers' time and
money spent investigating and defending against charges that are without a basis in
Title VII.
President Reagan will have federal agencies propound economic impact state-
ments before promulgating new regulations. Weidenbaum, Regulation: How Wash-
ington Will Switch, NATION'S Bus., Feb. 1981, at 26; see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). A transition task force has recommended to President
Reagan that all new EEOC guidelines be reviewed by the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of Civil Rights and that there be a one-year freeze on new EEOC
guidelines. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 5186 (Jan., 1981).
Of course, where sexual harassment exists, it is costly to the employer. The
replacement of sexually harassed workers who leave their jobs, the payment of sick
leave and medical insurance benefits for harassed employees, and the cost of de-
creased productivity is estimated to have cost the federal government $189 million
between May 1978 and May 1980. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 75-84.
